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ABSTRACT 
 We examine how institutions influence the government’s decisions on reporting and revising its 
fiscal data, and reforming its accounting system into an accrual basis. The effect of accrual accounting 
adoption on fiscal policy outcomes is also studied. While the literature analyzes only developed countries, 
we construct the extensive panel data including less developed countries and show that institutions play a 
different role in fiscal policy decisions and outcomes between the developed and the less developed ones.  
In Chapter 1, we investigate how the government reports and revises its fiscal data. We find that 
while rule of law, legislative electoral competition, financial openness and population enhance reporting 
the fiscal data, natural resource rents, executive electoral competition and cabinet size prevent it. Also, we 
suggest that GDP per capita, bureaucratic quality, a presidential regime, election in the next year and 
ethno-linguistic fractionalization make the government diminish the time lag of reporting. Recently, 
trends that the government opens a small deficit at first and revises it to a big deficit later have been found. 
We show that these revisions come from a bias of initially released fiscal data as well as new information 
after the initial release. Also, while the early-reporting government releases balance initially without a 
bias in the developed countries, the late-reporting government does in the less developed ones. Lastly, we 
discover that fiscal rules, administrative quality and inflation diminish revisions from a small to a big 
deficit, but responsiveness of the government to people expands them in the developed countries. 
However, only real GDP growth decreases them significantly in the less developed countries. 
In Chapter 2, we study which factors determine accrual accounting adoption among governments. 
We find that wealth such as GDP per capita and democracy facilitate the adoption consistently in all 
countries. However, while political competition, common law tradition, spread of accrual accounting 
among other governments and rule of law enhance the adoption in the developed countries, bureaucratic 
quality, education and economic stability are the important factors to encourage it in the less developed 
countries. 
In Chapter 3, we look into how the adoption of accrual accounting affects fiscal policy outcomes 
such as debt, balance and the discrepancy between a net increase of debt and a deficit that is a proxy for 
fiscal transparency. We discover that while the adoption diminishes debt in the developed countries, it 
expands them in the less developed ones. These effects become strong in highly-indebted countries. The 
adoption improves balance in the developed countries and worsens it in the less developed ones, which is 
significant only in the developed ones with big deficits. Also, it lessens the discrepancy significantly and 
improves fiscal transparency only in the less transparent developed countries.  
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CHAPTER 1 
Institutions, Economic Conditions, Fiscal Transparency:   
The Determinants of Fiscal Balance Report and Revision
1
  
 
1.1 Introduction 
 Government finances play crucial roles in any economy. Efficient functioning of the economy 
requires public access to transparent fiscal data. Also, the demands for accurate fiscal information are 
increasing because the government finance has an extensive influence on the economy of a country and 
the lives of people (Open Budget Survey, 2012). Nevertheless, not all governments provide their fiscal 
information sufficiently and without delay. Some governments, especially in the less developed countries, 
do not reveal their finances at all or disclose them long after the fiscal year has passed. In addition, some 
governments are suspected of releasing seemingly good fiscal information at first and revising it to a less 
rosy picture afterward. That is, they announce a small deficit initially and then revise it into a large deficit 
later (de Castro et al., 2011; Beetsma et al., 2011), as seen in Figure 1.1
2
. Naturally, the government does 
have some unavoidable reasons for revising the fiscal information after publishing it such as technical 
errors, newly obtained information and a change in the methods used to produce the data. However, if 
revisions of fiscal information
3
 by governments have a specific trend (for instance, governments have a 
tendency to revise their deficits and debt into bigger ones than those announced at first), it can be deduced 
that the revisions are a result of manipulation of initial fiscal information
4
 by the government, not 
technical errors or standards changes.               
                                                     
1
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2
 Government financial data of a certain fiscal year are not fixed at the first announcement but are changeable after 
it. For instance, government balances of the US in fiscal year 2006 were -1.9% per GDP in the IFS book with the 
vintage of Sep. 2007, -2.1% from the vintage of Mar. 2008, -1.9% from the vintage of Mar. 2009, and -2.3% from 
the vintage of Sep. 2011.     
   
3
 Revision of fiscal information is defined as the discrepancy of fiscal variables such as balance for particular years 
and countries across different data releases and vintages. 
 
4
 Hereafter, “initial” and “last” indicate the fiscal information in the data that the government released initially and 
finally, respectively. For example, if government balances of the US in fiscal year 2006 are shown in the IFS books 
from the vintage of Sep. 2007 to the vintage of Jun. 2012, “initial” balance will be the balance in the IFS book with 
the vintage of Sep. 2007 and “last” balance will be the balance in the IFS book with the vintage of Jun. 2012.   
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Then what makes one government’s reports and revisions of fiscal information different from 
another’s? We analyze reports and revisions of government financial information (especially, balance) and 
look for the determinants of the reports and revisions. In other words, we investigate what factors make 
the government report its fiscal information at first and then revise it after initial announcement, notably 
changing to bigger deficits and debt. In addition, we look into how reports and revisions differ between 
the developed and the less developed countries.    
We use the data from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) books published by the IMF 
from 2000 to 2012. Since the IFS books we are adopting span 50 various vintages and each IFS book 
contains fiscal information for the 7 previous years, we can find when the government reported the 
information to the IFS and how large the government revised its fiscal information between IFS books 
with different vintages. However, the time series of the data in the IFS is disconnected because a new 
Government Financial Statistics Manual (GFSM) was applied to the IFS books published from August 
2007. Hence, we distinguish the data before and after the new GFSM application to the IFS
5
, and 
primarily employ the data in the new GFSM period because the latest data better reflect behaviors of the 
government and because revisions are a recent phenomenon. We use the data in the old GFSM period in 
order to check whether estimation results from the data in the new GFSM period are consistently effective 
during the old GFSM period.    
 We analyze reports and revisions and find the determinants of them using various viewpoints; (i) 
whether the government reports its fiscal information or not, (ii) how long the government takes to report 
it, (iii) whether revisions come from a bias of initial fiscal information or newly obtained information 
after the first release, (iv) how the time lag of reporting affects the discrepancy between initial balance 
and last balance, and (v) how large the government revises its initial fiscal information. Then, we look 
into the determinants of (i), (ii), and (v). We use a different dependent variable for each analysis, and 
since each dependent variable has a different feature, we employ a different estimation method that is 
proper to each; Probit regression for (i), Heckman sample selection for (ii), a fixed effects model for (iii) 
and (iv), and a random effects model for (v).    
 Since the government in the developed countries is homogeneous in reporting, we place priority 
on reports in less developed ones. We find from the analysis of (i) that while a government with good rule 
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 Hereafter, the period after new GFSM application to the IFS during fiscal years 2006~2011 is abbreviated as “the 
new GFSM period,” and the period before new GFSM application to the IFS during fiscal years 1999~2006 is 
abridged as “the old GFSM period.” 
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of law, strong electoral competition of the legislature, open financial system and big population is more 
inclined to report, a government with great natural resource rents, strong electoral competition of the 
executive and big cabinet size is inclined not to report. However, natural resource rents enhance reporting 
in a government with good corruption control. Estimation results of (ii) suggest that not only high levels 
of GDP per capita, bureaucratic quality, ethno-linguistic fractionalization, but also election in the next 
year make the government likely to report early. Also, governments under a presidential regime disclose 
faster than those under a parliamentary regime.  
Since revisions of fiscal information are found in both the developed and the less developed 
countries, we analyze revisions by separating countries as well as aggregating them. Our estimation of (iii) 
shows that revisions are affected significantly by a bias from releasing good-looking fiscal data at first as 
well as newly obtained information after the initial release in both groups of countries. We discover in the 
estimation of (iv) that as the government in the less developed countries reports earlier, the initial balance 
gets smaller than the last balance, which implies that fast reporting becomes a cause of revision. Lastly, 
the analysis of (v) indicates that strong fiscal institutions, good administrative quality, and inflation 
diminish negative revisions,
6
 but responsiveness of the government to people enlarges them in the 
developed countries. However, only real GDP growth decreases negative revisions significantly in the 
less developed countries. Hence, we discover that different factors influence revisions when comparing 
the developed countries and the less developed countries. 
 There is a limitation in the literature in that the analysis of reports and revisions of government 
financial data is restricted to the developed country. Hence, this paper becomes the first attempt to analyze 
reports and revisions in the less developed one.  
This study suggests a new implication for enhancing fiscal transparency. First, since the 
determinants of reports and revisions differ between the developed and the less developed countries, a 
differentiated approach is needed for each group. Also, the government, which is assessed as having good 
fiscal transparency in the previous literature, is more inclined to have negative revisions and is suspected 
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 “Negative revision” in balance indicates that the last balance is smaller than the initial balance, or, in other words, 
the last deficit is bigger than the initial deficit and balance is worsened by revisions. “Positive revision” in balance 
means that the last balance is greater than the initial balance, or, in other words, the last deficit is smaller than the 
initial deficit and balance is improved by revisions. “No revision” means that the last balance is the same as the 
initial balance. 
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of releasing window dressing of fiscal information at first.
7
 This indicates that the current measurement 
of fiscal transparecy primarily reflects the quantity of fiscal information disclosure and is limited by not 
including the quality of it. Therefore, construction of a new measurement for fiscal transparency that can 
reflect window dressing of fiscal information is needed. 
 We will introduce the existing literature on this topic in the second section, and explain our 
model and hypothesis in the third section. The data and variables of this paper will be suggested in the 
fourth section. The estimation strategies and results will be shown in the fifth and sixth section 
respectively. We will deliver our conclusion in the last section. 
 
1.2 Existing Literature 
 Even though the fiscal information of governments has grown more important recently, the 
research on reports or revisions of government financial data and their determinants has been rare up until 
this point.  
1.2.1 Reports 
 Studies on reports have been conducted primarily in the form of fiscal transparency because 
fiscal transparency is measured by how much the government reveals its fiscal information. In particular, 
the literature such as Islam (2006) and Hollyer et al. (2013) gauges transparency as frequency and speed 
in the release of data to international agencies. Most literature shows how fiscal transparency affects 
government finance through the following: it improves fiscal performance such as deficits and debt and 
moderates the political budget cycle (Alt et al., 2006a, 2006b); it heightens a country’s credit rating 
(Hameed, 2005); it lowers sovereign borrowing costs (Glennerster et al., 2008); and it restricts creative 
accounting (Alt et al., 2012). However, it is hard to find research that deals with the determinants of fiscal 
transparency or fiscal information reports except Alt et al. (2006c), Wehner et al. (2012) and Rodríguez 
Bolívar et al. (2013).  
Alt et al. (2006c) show that both politics and fiscal outcomes influence fiscal transparency from   
the data of the 48 U.S. states during the period 1972~2002. They suggest that while political competition 
and fiscal imbalances such as a high deficit or surplus increase fiscal transparency, political polarization 
and debt accumulation decrease it. In particular, they argue that incumbents try to tie the hands of other 
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politicians who will take policymaking authority and, thus, political competition is associated with 
transparency positively. Wehner et al. (2012) employ a cross-national dataset (85 countries) in 2008 and 
argue that citizens and legislators are important sources of the demand for fiscal transparency. They 
indicate that free and fair elections to reflect a democracy level have a positive effect on fiscal 
transparency, whereas oil and gas wealth has a negative impact on it. They also point out that partisan 
fragmentation in the legislature increases transparency only in countries with free and fair elections. 
Rodríguez Bolívar et al. (2013) suggest from the analysis of prior literature (the meta-analysis technique) 
that political competition, financial conditions and the size of public administration have a positive 
relationship with the disclosure of public financial information. They also indicate that this relationship is 
affected by administrative culture, the level of public administration such as national or municipal 
government and year of publication.
8
   
However, each study analyzes the U.S. state government data, the cross national data or the 
previous literature, respectively and has a limitation that it does not use the panel data on central 
governments. Hence, extensive study of data that includes many countries during a certain period is 
needed to find the determinants of reports. 
1.2.2 Revisions 
The literature that investigates revisions of government financial data is scarce. Though 
Balassone et al. (2006) and Mora et al. (2007) reveal that the deficits of EU member countries are poor 
indicators of government finance because they are subject to significant revision, comprehensive research 
of revisions and their determinants is limited to de Castro et al. (2011) and Beetsma et al. (2011).        
 Castro et al. (2011) analyze the data of 15 EU countries from 1995 to 2008 and suggest that most 
deficit data are biased to a smaller level for the initial release and are revised to a bigger level later. This 
bias during revision is caused by the fact that whether the government satisfies the Stability and Growth 
Pact (SGP)
9
 of the EU is judged upon the data released initially. Castro et al. (2011) also look for the 
determinants that influence revisions of fiscal balance; while negative revisions decrease under high 
expected real GDP growth and strong fiscal rules, they increase in pre-election and election years. 
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modernization reform, those after 2000 examine how administrative reforms have improved fiscal transparency. 
 
9
 The SGP requires each member country of the EU to implement a fiscal policy to stay within a certain limit for 
government deficit (3% of GDP) and debt (60% of GDP). 
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Beetsma et al. (2011) investigate the determinants of implementation error (difference between 
planned and nowcast
10
 value) and revision error (difference between nowcast and finally revised value) 
in balances by employing the data of 14 EU countries during the period 1998~2008. They find that 
planned and nowcast balances are more optimistic than nowcast and finally revised balances, respectively. 
Also, implementation error comes mainly from inaccuracy of expenditure, but revision error is caused by 
fallacy of revenue. They propose that while economic growth and quality of fiscal institutions 
(characterized by tight fiscal rules and midterm budgetary framework) diminish negative revision error, 
political factors such as type (majority, minority, and coalition), ideological orientation (left, right, central) 
of the government and election do not influence revision error. 
Cimadomo (2007) examines the data on government debt among 19 OECD countries from 1995 
to 2006 and mentions that debt-to-GDP ratio at the end of the fiscal year is often remarkably different 
from what is observed at the end of the sample. Also, Cimadomo (2011) suggests from analysis of the 
previous literature that strong fiscal institutions characterized by numerical fiscal rules are associated with 
accurate data releases. 
However, these studies analyze revisions only in the developed countries, especially EU member 
countries. Until now, comprehensive research that includes the less developed countries as well as the 
developed countries has not been found. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate precisely the fiscal data 
revisions in many countries.   
 
1.3 Model and Hypothesis 
1.3.1 Reports  
 If the government is willing and able to report, then it will report naturally. Dissemination of the 
data is a reflection of both the willingness and the capability of the government to provide information 
(Hollyer et al., 2013). What makes the government willing and able to report? If the government obtains 
political support from opening fiscal information and extends its political rents, it will be willing to open 
its fiscal information (Alt et al., 2006a). Political conditions influence the willingness of the government 
to report by leveraging political support. However, though the government tries to report eagerly, 
reporting will not be implemented unless the government has sufficient capability. Some governments in 
the less developed countries want to release fiscal information, but they fail frequently because of 
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incapability due to a deficiency of financial and administrative resources.   
 First, political institutes and environment are directly related to political support and affect the 
willingness of the government to report.  
If political institutes or groups check government performances intently, they will demand fiscal 
information, and the government will open it to meet their demands and get political consents. Since 
political power in a presidential regime is separated between the executive and the legislature, “check and 
balance” is strong (Persson et al., 2000). The legislature in a presidential regime watches the performance 
of the government (i.e. the executive) more intensively. Also, if a country is fractionalized ethnically and 
linguistically, ethnic and linguistic groups will compete against each other to obtain more benefits from 
the government and observe fiscal performance more eagerly. However, if the government has internal 
fractionalization, not external fractionalization like above, it will have less need to open information to 
outside of the government and have difficulty in reaching an agreement about a policy to open fiscal 
information (North, 1991). 
    (Hypothesis 1) The government with political agents that are strongly interested in government 
finance shows a propensity to report.            
Strong electoral competition stands for a high level of democracy, and governments in 
democratized countries disclose more data than those in non-democratized countries (Hollyer et al., 2011). 
Also, if an incumbent party hardly ascertains winning in the election under tough competition, it will be 
more likely to bind other parties’ behaviors by actively opening fiscal information in order to secure its 
political rent (Alt et al., 2006c). In addition, if an election is to be held in the next year, people will 
demand more fiscal information to evaluate the performance of the government and decide their votes.   
(Hypothesis 2) The government that is influenced heavily by election has a tendency to report. 
 Rule of law assesses the development of a legal system and the observance of the laws by the 
people. Since reporting fiscal performances to people is a duty of the government
11
 and is legalized in 
most countries, rule of law contributes to enhancing reports. Also, rule of law is considered a proxy of the 
institutional level of a country, and Andreula et al. (2009) show that a better quality of institution leads to 
higher fiscal transparency. 
(Hypothesis 3) The government with a high level of rule of law is willing to report. 
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Second, if the government is free from domestic or foreign pressure, it will have less incentive to 
report its fiscal data and try to increase its rents by hiding its fiscal data.    
If the government collects revenue from rents of natural resources rather than tax, it will be 
independent of political pressure of people to open fiscal information and will be likely to be corrupted 
because people are less interested in government finance due to a smaller tax burden and the government 
gets big benefits from corruption. However, if corruption is controlled well, the government will disclose 
its fiscal information in order to tout the low tax burden to people in order to gain political support.       
(Hypothesis 4) The government that depends on revenue from natural resources is less inclined 
to report. However, it is different in countries where corruption of the government is controlled 
thoroughly.  
If the economy is integrated into international finance market, international financial institutes 
will require the government to report its fiscal data in order to protect their assets. Therefore, the 
government’s reporting will be enhanced by the external pressure of international financial institutes. 
(Hypothesis 5) The government with high financial openness is inclined to report its fiscal data. 
Third, reporting fiscal information is affected by economic and administrative capability of the 
government. Since it costs resources to produce its fiscal information, some governments with deficient 
economic resources have difficulty in releasing reports. GDP per capita and population are representative 
proxies of the economic capability of a country. Ingram (1984) suggests that as the wealth of a country 
increases, politicians will expand the disclosure of fiscal information. In addition, if the government has a 
high quality of administration, it will cost less to disclose its fiscal information.  
(Hypothesis 6) The government with high economic and administrative capability tends toward 
reporting. 
1.3.2 Revisions 
 Why does the government release good-looking fiscal information such as a small deficit and 
debt at first and revise it into a bad-looking one afterwards? Because it is one of the ways for the 
government to increase political support or avoid losing it. Since people have experienced economic crisis 
from unsound government finance, they emphasize fiscal discipline. If the government announces fiscal 
information that looks negative in terms of fiscal discipline such as a big deficit or debt, it will lose 
political support. However, if people concentrate their interests on current fiscal information that is 
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reported initially, not past fiscal information that was released several years ago (de Castro et al., 2011), 
then the government will have an incentive to release beautified fiscal information at first and to revise it 
into actual data later. Also, even if the government does not deceive with its fiscal information at first, it 
revises it later because of technical errors and new information that are not observed at initial release. The 
government with a good quality of administration diminishes the number of errors and provides precise 
fiscal information initially. 
 First, good-quality fiscal institutions prevent the government from manipulating its fiscal 
information and encourage the government to release actual information. Weber (2012) and Andreula et al. 
(2009) show that good fiscal institutions improve fiscal transparency and diminish creative accounting by 
the government. Also, the number of fiscal rules can be a proxy for the quality of fiscal institutions
12
.  
(Hypothesis 1) The government with good fiscal institutions is prevented from revising its fiscal 
information negatively.   
Second, if the economy grows substantially or experiences inflation rather than deflation, the 
government will collect revenue easily and fiscal policy outcomes such as deficit will be in good shape. 
Hence, economic growth and inflation is a disincentive for the government to beautify the deficit at the 
initial release. 
(Hypothesis 2) The government with high economic growth and inflation has a tendency not to 
have negative revision.  
 Third, if the government responds to people’s opinions sensitively and people pay a great deal of 
attention to initial fiscal data, the government will make a short-sighted decision and try to satisfy fiscal 
discipline by releasing beautified fiscal information at first.     
(Hypothesis 3) The government with more responsiveness to people is inclined to release window 
dressing of fiscal information at first and revise it later.  
Lastly, the government might make an error in producing its fiscal information not intentionally 
but technically, which becomes a reason for negative revision. Good administrative capability contributes 
to lessening these errors. Furthermore, the government with a high quality of administration is somewhat 
autonomous from political pressure (World Governance Indicator, 2013), and it opens fiscal information 
that is not manipulated, escaping from political consideration.    
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(Hypothesis 4) The government with high quality of administration is prohibited from negative 
revisions in balance. 
 
1.4 Description of the Data    
In this paper, we use the government financial data from the IMF’s IFS books of 188 countries 
during fiscal years 1999~2011 which were published on a quarterly basis (March, June, September, 
December) from March 2000 to June 2012 (50 IFS books). The IFS book contains the government 
financial data from the 7 previous years.
13
 However, we employ the data from fiscal year 1999, not 1993 
because the data for fiscal year 1999 appeared in the IFS book published in 2000 for the first time and we 
can grasp initial fiscal information from fiscal year 1999. Furthermore, initial fiscal information is 
indispensable for the analysis of revision and time lag of reporting.  
 We choose the IFS data because the IFS data contain all important government financial data 
such as revenue, expense, balance, debt as well as reported government type,
14
 accounting standard
15
 of 
many countries (198 countries in 2012) and other economic indicators such as GDP. While the IMF’s 
GFS yearbooks are published on a yearly basis, the IFS books are released much more frequently and we 
can find the timing of reporting and revision more precisely.      
 The thing that we should pay attention to is that the continuity of the series in the IFS data is 
broken in 2007 because the standards to build the government financial data in the IFS changed.
16
 New 
GFSM is applied to the IFS data published from August 2007 onward.
17
 As seen in Table 1.1, while the 
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 The IFS book which was published in 2000 has the government financial data of fiscal years from 1993 to 1999. 
 
14
 The number of countries according to reported government type (2012, 123 countries):  
  (central) 15, (budgetary central) 63, (general) 45  
 
15
 The number of countries according to governmental accounting system (2012, 124 countries): 
(cash) 68, (non cash) 56 
 
16
 76 among the 91 countries that reported their balances to the IFS book in September 2007 revised them and the 
size of the revisions of balance was big. 
 
17
 Changes in the government financial data of the IFS in August 2007 
 before August 2007 From August 2007 
GFSM 
Government type 
Accounting standard 
GFSM 1986 
Central/ Budgetary Central  
Cash  
GFSM 2001 
Central / Budgetary Central / General 
Cash / Accrual  
* In the case of the GFS yearbook, GFSM change happens in 2003. 
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data of fiscal years 1999~2006 are built according to an old GFSM, the data in fiscal years 2006~2011 
follows a new GFSM.
18
 Also, the number of publications differs according to fiscal year. For instance, 
the data of fiscal year 2006 is published in the 26-vintage IFS books from September 2007 to June 2012, 
but the data of fiscal year 2011 is released in only 2-vintages of March and June 2012. We mainly use the 
data to which the new GFSM is applied (i.e. the data that is shaded heavily in Table 1.1) because the 
analysis of recent behaviors by the government provides timely implications and revisions are found 
frequently in later years. Also, 8 developed countries
19
 that submitted to not the IFS but the GFS during 
the old GFSM period begin to report from the new GFSM period. We use the data in the old GFSM 
period to check whether estimation results from the data in the new GFSM period are consistently valid.  
We subtract some observations from our data. A few governments change their methods to 
produce financial information sometimes. For instance, a government switches the scope of institutes 
included in the government and transactions included in deficit calculation. Since the IFS assigns 
asterisks (*) to the information to which a new method is applied for the first time, we can find these 
changes. We rule out revisions from these method changes in the analysis of revisions because these 
revisions are usually so big that our estimation can be greatly affected by these outliers. 
We compare reports and revisions between the developed countries and the less developed ones 
because the government in the developed countries might have a different incentive to report and revise 
from that in the less developed countries. We use the IMF’s criterion, “advanced economies20” to 
distinguish developed countries from less developed ones. The “advanced economies” look appropriate 
because they are not biased geographically and are chosen by a credible international agency.  
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 The GFSM change was implemented in the middle of 2007 and the data for fiscal year 2006 were constructed on 
both GFSMs. Though the data for fiscal year 2006 in the new GFSM period might not be initial information, they 
are included. Because the gap between the GFSM change and the start of year is just two quarters and the initial data 
of fiscal year 2006 are nearly same as those of the IFS book in September 2007, considering the average time lag of 
reporting. Also, the IFS published from August 2007 has not only the data of fiscal years 2006~2011 but also the 
data of fiscal years 2000~2005, but we exclude the data of fiscal years 2000~2005 from the data of the new GFSM 
period because of the same reason that we use the data from fiscal year 1999. 
  
19
 Austria, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Japan, Malta, Portugal, Hong Kong 
 
20
 IMF advanced economies (31 countries): United States, United Kingdom, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, San Marino, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Finland, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Malta, Portugal, Spain, Australia, New Zealand, Cyprus, Israel, China, P.R. (Hong Kong), 
Korea, Singapore, Slovenia 
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1.4.1 Reports 
Table 1.2 shows summary statistics on reporting balances among governments. The governments 
in the developed countries mostly disclose their fiscal balance and submit the balance of most fiscal years 
to the IFS than the governments in the less developed ones. All governments in the developed countries 
except San Marino and New Zealand submit a balance to the IFS during the new GFSM period especially. 
In other words, the governments in the developed countries show homogeneity in reporting. Therefore, 
the analysis of the report focuses on the governments in the less developed countries. Also, the number of 
fiscal years to report in the developed ones increases drastically during fiscal years 2006~2011 because 
some developed countries began to report in the new GFSM period. 
 Early reporting is more valuable to people because of its timeliness. Time lag of reporting
21
 is 
shorter in the developed countries than in less developed ones. While it decreases in the developed 
countries during the new GFSM period, it increases slightly in the less developed countries. This change 
is due to the fact that the governments in the developed countries that adopted the new GFSM early seem 
to produce fiscal information easily but the governments in the less developed countries seems to have 
difficulty in following the new GFSM. Also, the correlation between the number of reported fiscal years 
and time lag of reporting shows that the governments that report more frequently usually report earlier, 
especially in the developed countries. 
Figure 1.2.a shows that the number of countries reporting a balance decreases according to fiscal 
years in both periods before and after new GFSM application, though it diminishes slowly in the data of 
the developed countries after new GFSM application. Figure 1.2.b suggests that time lag of reporting also 
decreases according to fiscal years in both the old GFSM period and the new GFSM period. Time lag to 
reporting in all fiscal years except 1999 and 2011 is shorter in the developed countries than in the less 
developed ones.  
1.4.2 Revisions 
 The observations of revisions are classified into three categories; (i) reported and revised, (ii) 
reported and non-revised, and (iii) non-reported and non-revised. We describe revisions of countries by 
using only observations in the categories of (i) and (ii).    
                                                     
21
 How to measure time lag of reporting is introduced in section 1-5. 
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 Table 1.3 summarizes revisions of balance among governments. The governments in the 
developed countries revise their balance more than do those in less developed ones. They revise their 
balance in 75.6% of the analyzed fiscal years during the new GFSM period. While revisions in the less 
developed countries do not differ much between the old and new GFSM periods, revisions in the 
developed countries rise drastically during the new GFSM period. Though size of revisions
22
 is negative 
in both country groups on average, it is strongly negative in the developed countries during the new 
GFSM period. This data imply that revisions, especially negative revisions, have become the norm in the 
developed countries recently, and the governments in the developed countries are suspected of window 
dressing initial fiscal information these days. The time that the government takes to revise their balance 
becomes notably shorter in the developed countries during the new GFSM period. It is statistically 
significant only in the developed countries during the new GFSM period that the governments that report 
early also revise early.  
Figure 1.3.a indicates the number of countries that revised their fiscal balance. This number 
decreases faster pursuant to fiscal years in the less developed countries and falls sharply at the end of the 
analysis period (i.e. fiscal year 2011) because of the structure of data in Table 1.1.  
Table 1.4 shows the size of revisions and the number of countries that have positive, negative, 
and no revision in balance, respectively, according to fiscal years. While positive revisions are found 
frequently during the old GFSM period, they are scarcely seen during the new GFSM period. Also, we 
can see in Figure 1.3.b that greater negative revisions are found especially in the developed countries 
during the new GFSM period. This continues to indicate that negative revisions are a recent phenomenon 
in the developed ones. Also, a tendency of revisions in a country during the new GFSM period is 
positively and significantly correlated with that during the old GFSM period.
23
 In other words, a country 
that revises its balance positively (negatively) before the new GFSM application is inclined to continue 
revising positively (negatively) after the new GFSM application.   
Lastly, Table 1.5 shows revisions in revenue and expenditure of the governments and implies 
that negative revisions in balance among countries are caused by revisions of expenditure rather than 
revenue, because revisions in expenditure usually have a positive sign and size of revisions in expenditure 
                                                     
22
 How to calculate size of revision is introduced in Section 1.5. 
 
23
 Correlation between size of revisions before and after new GFSM application to the IFS: 0.3066 (p-value: 
0.0000)  
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is bigger than that in revenue. This trend becomes strong in the new GFSM period. However, this finding 
does not consist with the argument of Beetsma et al. (2011). 
1.4.3 Data on the determinants of reports and revisions 
The data of the determinants on reports and revisions are obtained from a survey of international 
agencies such as the World Bank, research institutes like the Political Risk Services and the previous 
literature. Table 1.6 provides an overview of the variables, including a short description and sources. 
Table 1.7 summarizes the average value of the determinants used in this paper and compares 
them between the developed and the less developed countries. The developed ones have better institutions 
in rule of law, control of corruption, bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, and government 
effectiveness. Also, they have greater financial openness, more fiscal rules and stronger electoral 
competitiveness. However, the less developed countries are more fractionalized among ethnic and 
linguistic groups, and adopt a presidential regime rather than a parliamentary regime. They depend more 
on revenue from natural resources. The economy in the less developed countries grows higher in the real 
term than does that in the developed ones, but it shows much greater inflation. Also, the differences 
between the periods before and after new GFSM application seem to be slight. 
 
1.5 Empirical Strategies 
1.5.1 Reports 
In this part, we will explain the empirical strategies used to investigate what factors influence 
decisions of the government on (i) reporting or non-reporting, and (ii) timing of reporting. A different 
estimation method is employed for each analysis.  
(i) In order to find the determinants of reporting or non-reporting, a time-variant dummy variable 
to indicate whether the government reports or does not in a specific fiscal year is constructed. For instance, 
if the US submits a balance for fiscal year 2007 to the IFS, then “1” will be assigned to the dependent 
variable in 2007. Otherwise, “0” will be given. Hence, probit regression is used according to the feature 
of the dependent variable. However, this dependent variable does not consider when fiscal information is 
released. 
15 
 
(ii) We measure time lag of reporting by considering the first day of a fiscal year.
24
 For instance, 
if the government, in which its fiscal year starts on July 1
st
, reports its balance for fiscal year 2002 to the 
IFS published in December 2003, then the time lag of this report will be calculated as follows; 
Time lag of balance of fiscal year 2002 =  
4 (time gap (quarters) between the end of 2002 and 4
th
 quarter of 2003)  
- 2(time gap (quarters) between the beginning of 2002 and the first day of a fiscal year)        
= 2 (quarters). 
However, we cannot observe time lag of reporting by countries that do not report fiscal 
information to the IFS. Given that most of the non-reporting countries belong to the category of the less 
developed countries and they usually report fiscal information later than the developed countries, as seen 
in Table 1.2, exclusion of non-reporting countries from the analyzed data makes the data of time lag 
biased downward. In order to respond to this bias, we employ Heckman sample selection. We use the 
determinants found in the analysis of reporting and non-reporting in the first stage and look for the 
determinants on time lag of reporting in the second stage of Heckman sample selection.       
In addition, Figures 1.2 point out that reporting or non-reporting as well as time lag of reporting 
changes according to fiscal years, and it indicates that we need to control for impacts from different fiscal 
years. Hence, we include year-indicator variables in our regressions. 
1.5.2  Revisions 
We investigate (i) whether revisions come from a bias in fiscal balance released at first or newly 
obtained information after the first release, (ii) how time lag of reporting influences the difference 
between initial balance/GDP and last balance/GDP, and (iii) what factors affect the size of revisions. 
We construct a time-variant variable to measure the size of revisions by dividing the discrepancy 
between last balance and initial balance by estimated GDP during the analysis period;    
                            
                          
             
 
Since the IFS data is released in a country’s own currency, division by GDP is needed in order to compare 
                                                     
24
 A fiscal year usually begins on Jan. 1
st
 but the first day of a fiscal year differs among countries.  
  The first day of a fiscal year and the number of countries (2012, among 123 countries):                                                          
  (1.1) 94 / (3.1) 1 / (3.21) 1 / (4.1) 11 / (7.1) 11 / (7.7) 1 / (7.16) 1 / (10.1) 3  
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size of revisions among the governments. More specifically, estimated GDP is used in order to eradicate 
the influence of GDP revisions on size of revisions because our interests are focused on revisions of 
balance, not GDP. In addition, we analyze not only revisions of all countries but also differences in 
revisions between the developed countries and the less developed countries by separated regression.   
(i) What we are interested in is whether fiscal information is revised because of a bias in the 
initial balance or newly happened events and obtained information after the initial release. We investigate 
this by adopting a methodology found in de Castro et al. (2011). 
We construct simple equations as follows; 
            
              
       
   
                                       
            
              
       
   
                                        
If                          then it will imply that fiscal balance in initial release 
influences the size of revisions. Revisions can be anticipated at the initial announcement of balance and 
are not caused by unexpected events and information. If                        , then it will 
indicate that revisions are derived from new events and information after initial release.   
The data on revision size is unbalanced panel data and if we regress size of revisions on initial or 
final balance/GDP by simple OLS, revisions by the governments with relatively more observations will 
be reflected in our estimation strongly. Hence, we use a country and year fixed effects model. Country 
and year fixed effects can capture characteristics of a specific country, such as culture and norms, and 
cross-country related macroeconomic shocks in a certain year, such as oil price shock or a world-wide 
financial crisis, that are not fully reflected in initial or last balance/GDP of the estimated equation 
respectively. To include country and year fixed effects also becomes the response to the omitted-variable 
problem. 
(ii) We look into how time lag of reporting influences the difference between initial and final 
balance/GDP. If we assume that the final balance/GDP is closest to an actual value, we can find the effect 
of report time lag on a bias of initial balance/GDP from regression of the following equation; 
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If             then time lag of reporting affects the difference between initial balance/GDP and last 
balance/GDP. A fixed effects model is also employed similar to the analysis of (i). 
(iii) We investigate what factors determine the size of revisions. Since negative revisions are our 
primary interest, we look into what increases or decreases negative revisions among governments. A 
random effects model is adopted for finding these determinants because comparisons of revisions among 
governments as well as change of revisions within a government are important. Also, since some of the 
unchanging country features are of analytical interest and can be the determinants of revisions, sweeping 
them away and considering only changes within a country throws out important information. Institutions 
such as fiscal rules, democratic accountability and government effectiveness do not change in some 
countries during the analysis period. Also, we include year-indicator variables because of the data 
structure and time trend in Figures 1.3. 
 
1.6  Estimation Results 
1.6.1  Reports 
We investigate the determinants of (i) reporting or non-reporting and (ii) time lag of reporting 
among governments. Most governments in the developed countries submit their fiscal information to the 
IFS within a year after the end of a fiscal year.
25
 Differences in reporting are found mainly among 
governments in the less developed countries. Hence, our analysis concentrates on reports in the less 
developed countries.   
We use the approach to find the determinants of (i) and (ii) for fiscal year 2007 at first and then 
check whether these determinants are effective during the new GFSM period (i.e. fiscal years 2006~2011). 
The reason to analyze the data of fiscal year 2007 first is that since the number of publications differs 
according to fiscal years as seen in Table 1.1 and it influences reporting or non-reporting by the 
government, we might get more precise estimation results in analyzing a single fiscal year. Also, the data 
of fiscal year 2007 have been published in the IFS for a long period, from 2008 to 2012.
26
       
                                                     
25
 The governments in all developed countries except New Zealand and San Marino report their fiscal information 
to the IFS and average time lag of reporting is only 2.8 quarters.  
 
26
 Though the data for fiscal year 2006 also have a long period of publications, we employ the data of fiscal year 
2007 because initial release of the data of fiscal year 2006 during the new GFSM period is in August 2007, not 
January 2007, and this may affect the measurement of time lag of reporting.     
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First, we look into what are the determinants of reporting or non-reporting by the government. 
Tables 1.8 and 1.9 show the estimation results for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal years 2006~2011, 
respectively. As seen in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.8, rule of law, legislative electoral competitiveness, 
financial openness
27
 and population enhance reporting to the IFS, but executive electoral competitiveness 
and rents from natural resources discourage it.  
Since most countries legalize the disclosure of fiscal information, the governments with high 
rule of law implement it completely and are more inclined to report. As financial openness which is 
measured by total liabilities for foreign countries increases, the government will have bigger pressure to 
open its fiscal information from foreign investors or loaners and cannot but report it. Also, population 
becomes a proxy for the capability of the government to produce fiscal information as well as the demand 
of the people for fiscal information in a country, and the governments with big population report more 
actively. 
We are interested in the fact that electoral competitiveness in the legislature and the executive 
plays contradictory roles in reporting, which is not consistent with our hypothesis but can be interpreted 
as follows; as competition in legislative election gets strong, an incumbent party cannot be sure of 
winning the election, so it expands fiscal information reports in order to bind other parties and secure 
political rents of it in the case of losing the election. However, fierce competition in the executive election 
gives an incumbent an incentive to take an advantage of its information dominance by hiding or taking 
control of fiscal information. Messick (2009) argues that political competition leads governments to limit 
the disclosure of information that could be used to scrutinize and criticize its actions. 
    If the government fills up its revenue by selling natural resources, people will be less interested 
in government finance and members of the government will not report fiscal information in order to 
embezzle more rents from natural resources. However, as seen in columns (3) and (4) of Table 1.8, if the 
government is clean, rents from natural resources will boost fiscal information reports by the government. 
In other words, rents from natural resources hurt reporting only when the government is corrupt because it 
diverts the rents into its members’ pockets. In addition, columns (5) and (6) show that the governments 
with bigger cabinets are not willing to report because they have difficulty in finding an agreement for 
opening fiscal information in the government.  
                                                     
27
 Financial openness is insignificant in specification (1), (2) of Table 1.8 but it becomes significant in other 
specifications like (3), (5).  
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We certify in Table 1.9 that the determinants derived from the data of fiscal year 2007 are also 
valid in the new GFSM period.
28
 However, estimation results in Table 1.9 may not be completely precise 
because reports by the governments with more observations will be reflected in our estimation strongly. 
So we check the robustness by regressing a fixed effect (marginal effect) of each country on the 
determinants in Table 1.9. In the 1st stage to find a country's fixed effect, we use a fixed effects model and 
include a net increase of GDP per capita, foreign liabilities and natural resource rents as independent 
variables. In the 2nd stage to check the robustness the determinants, we use the average value of the 
determinants during fiscal years 2006~2011 for the OLS regression. Finally, Table 1.10 shows that the 
determinants are sufficiently robust. 
In addition, since the previous literature measures fiscal transparency by how much the 
government opens its fiscal information, our estimation results are consistent with it, which implies that 
reporting fiscal information to the international agencies is one of candidates for indexing fiscal 
transparency of the government. 
Second, we investigate the determinants on time lag of reporting. Tables 1.11 show the 
estimation results for fiscal year 2007 and fiscal years 2006~2011. High level of GDP per capita, 
bureaucratic quality and ethno-linguistic fractionalization as well as election in the next year and a 
presidential regime make the government more likely to report fiscal information fast. 
GDP per capita and bureaucratic qualities are proxies to reflect the capability of the government. 
As the government is more capable, it will produce and open fiscal information faster. However, an 
interaction term of these two variables adjusts their effects to diminish time lag of reporting because their 
effects can be overestimated if correlation between each other
29
 is not considered and will be weakened if 
they go beyond a certain threshold, as seen in developed countries where reports are homogeneous.    
If an election is held in 2008, people will demand fiscal information more in order to evaluate 
the performance of an incumbent. Ethno-linguistic fractionalization and a presidential regime increase the 
“check and balance” between ethno-linguistic groups or the legislature and the executive, respectively, 
and fiscal information should be reported by the government early to satisfy their demands. We ascertain 
                                                     
28
 We check whether these determinants are effective in the old GFSM period (i.e. fiscal years 1999~2006) and in 
overall periods (i.e. fiscal years 1999~2011) and find that they are valid irrespective of the analysis periods in the 
data.  
 
29
 Correlation between GDP per capita and bureaucratic quality: 0.7785 (p-value: 0.0000) 
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in columns (3), (4) of Table 1.11 that the determinants derived from the data of fiscal year 2007 are also 
valid in the data of the new GFSM period.
30
  
1.6.2  Revisions 
 We analyze revisions from three points of view; (i) whether revisions are influenced by a bias of 
balance at the first announcement or the newly obtained information after it, (ii) how time lag of reporting 
influences the difference between initial and last balance/GDP, and (iii) what influences size of revisions 
among governments.
31
  
First, we investigate whether fiscal information is revised because of a bias in the initial data 
release or because of newly obtained information after it. If the government opens window-dressing of 
fiscal balance at first and revises it later, more negative revisions will be found in the initially released 
balance that looks good. That is, the coefficient of initial balance/GDP will be significantly negative. If 
the government revises the balance because of new information, then the coefficient of final balance/GDP 
will be significantly positive because revisions and final balance/GDP move in the same direction. 
Table 1.12 shows that the coefficient of initial balance/GDP has a negative and significant value 
in every specification, and the coefficient of final balance/GDP has a positive and significant value in all 
countries and the developed countries. The former implies that if initial balance looks good, the 
government will have a tendency to revise it into a bad one later and might be suspected of announcing a 
beautified balance at the initial data release. The latter indicates that revisions are caused by new events 
and information after initial data release. Though the significance of the coefficient of final balance/GDP 
disappears in the less developed countries, the coefficient is still positive, which is identical with other 
specifications. Therefore, we conclude that the government revises fiscal information because of window 
dressing of balance as well as undetected information at the initial data release.
32
 
                                                     
30
 We check whether these determinants are effective in the old GFSM period (i.e. fiscal years 1999~2006) and for 
all periods (i.e. fiscal years 1999~2011) and find that they are valid irrespective of analysis period in the data.  
 
31
 We do not use the approach to extend from the analysis of fiscal year 2007 to that of fiscal years 2006~2011 for 
revisions because reports show almost the same pattern within a country during the analysis period but revisions, 
especially size of revision, fluctuate within a country during the analysis period.  
    
32
 We apply OLS and RE (Random Effects) models to this analysis and find that initial balance/GDP affects size of 
revisions negatively and significantly but the significance of last balance/GDP is lost in OLS and RE. In addition, 
we use an extended dataset during fiscal years 1999~2011 and discover that the coefficient of initial balance/GDP 
has a negative and significant value and the coefficient of last balance/GDP has a positive and significant value in 
OLS, RE as well as FE (Fixed Effects) models, which strengthens our finding.        
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 Second, we investigate how time lag of reporting influences the discrepancy between initial and 
last balance/GDP. Table 1.13 suggests estimation results. The government that reports a balance early 
announces correct fiscal information
33
 at first in the developed countries but as the government reports 
late, it releases an initial balance that is greater than the actual or final balance. However, since time lag of 
reporting in the developed countries is small and hardly dispersed,
34
 it is difficult to argue that time lag of 
reporting plays a crucial role in revisions by the developed ones. Whereas, the government with early 
reports announces a smaller balance than the actual one at first
35
 in the less developed countries and as 
the government reports late, it releases a correct balance at first. Average and standard deviation of time 
lag of reporting are substantial in the less developed countries and time lag of reporting influences size of 
revision significantly. It can be interpreted that hasty reporting becomes a reason for revisions in the less 
developed countries.
36
  
Lastly, we look into the determinants of revision size. Since negative revisions are our interest, 
we focus on finding what factors increase or decrease negative revisions.  
Table 1.14 shows that the determinants on size of revision differ between the developed and the 
less developed countries. While the number of fiscal rules, inflation and government effectiveness 
decreases negative revisions, democratic accountability increases them in the developed countries. 
However, real GDP growth is only a significant determinant to diminish negative revisions in the less 
developed ones. In other words, institutional level and economic condition affect revisions of balance in 
the developed countries, but revisions depend only on economic condition in the less developed ones.  
Since the number of fiscal rules and the index of government effectiveness reflect the strength of 
fiscal and administrative institutions in the developed countries, they contribute to preventing negative 
revisions. Also, since the government collects revenue easily under inflation rather than deflation, 
especially in the developed countries and has a small deficit, inflation plays a role in decreasing negative 
revisions. However, since the government with a high level of democratic accountability has a strong 
                                                     
33
 We test     in equation (3) and get F(1, 127) =0.48 (p-value: 0.4913) 
 
34
 Time lag of reporting  (developed)  average: 2.81,  standard deviation: 2.13 
                   (less developed)  average: 4.37, standard deviation: 3.69 
 
35
 We test     in equation (3) and get F(1, 326) =169.88 (p-value: 0.0000) 
 
36
 We also find in the extended dataset of fiscal years 1999~2011 that the governments in less developed countries 
that report late release the perfect data, which is more significant than in the dataset of fiscal years 2006~2011.  
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responsiveness to people or is more sensitive to people’s opinion, it will have a bigger incentive to 
beautify fiscal information at first and expand negative revisions.  
If a less developed country grows fast, the government will obtain sufficient revenue and show a 
small deficit, which diminishes negative revisions. Also, according to Lay et al. (2014), optimistic 
estimates of GDP are found frequently in the less developed countries, and they also lead to a 
good-looking balance. However, if the real GDP growth does not catch up with optimistic GDP 
estimation, the balance may be worse than the expected one and the government will be inclined to open 
beautified fiscal information in order to match the expected balance.       
In addition, the coefficient of initial balance/GDP is significant in the developed countries, but 
not in the less developed countries, which might be caused by the loss of observations in the less 
developed ones. In order to respond to it, we look for the determinants of revisions in the less developed 
countries by using Heckman sample selection, and find that the coefficient of initial balance/GDP is 
insignificantly negative and only real GDP growth is significant. The argument that revisions come from a 
bias of initial financial data get weak in the less developed countries.
37
 The fact that revisions are much 
more usual in the developed countries partly explains the insignificance of initial balance in the less 
developed countries.  
 
1.7  Conclusion 
 We analyze reports and revisions of fiscal information and investigate what affects the decision 
to report and revise among governments. We find that the decision on whether the government reports or 
not is influenced by not only political institutions such as rule of law, electoral competition and cabinet 
size but also financial openness, rent from natural resources and population, because the government 
wants to increase political rents through reporting if it has sufficient capability to produce fiscal 
information. We also find that time lag of reporting is affected by political conditions such as a 
presidential regime, election and ethno-linguistic fractionalization as well as variables related to the 
capability of the government such as GDP per capita and bureaucratic quality. 
                                                     
37
 We also find in the extended dataset of fiscal years 1999~2011 that all determinants such as fiscal rules, real GDP 
growth, inflation, democratic accountability and government effectiveness are significant when all countries are 
considered together. However, only government effectiveness and real GDP growth are significant in separated 
regressions between developed countries and less developed countries, respectively. Initial balance/GDP becomes 
significant in less developed countries. 
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We show that revisions are caused by both a bias of fiscal information at initial release and 
newly obtained information after initial announcement. Also, while the government to report early 
releases correct balance at first in the developed countries, the government to report late discloses perfect 
information in less developed ones. Lastly, we discover that institutions, such as fiscal rules and 
administrative quality, and economic conditions, such as inflation, contribute to diminishing negative 
revisions, but responsiveness of the government to people expands them in the developed countries. 
However, only real GDP growth is found to decrease negative revisions significantly in the less developed 
countries.  
 Our findings fill up a limitation in the previous literature in that the analysis of reports and 
revisions of fiscal information in the government is restricted to the developed countries, and provide a 
new implication of that reports and revisions are affected by different factors between the developed and 
the less developed countries and hence, different approaches are needed for improving fiscal transparency.  
However, this paper has a limitation in the data. We use the data of an international agency, 
which might make it difficult to find precise trends in revisions because the governments can defer 
submission of information to the international agency. There is a possibility that the governments 
announce manipulated fiscal information at first in their own country, revise it during the deterred period 
and report it to the international agencies accurately. If we obtain the domestic fiscal information released 
initially by the government, we can evade possible inaccuracies in the data given to international agencies, 
which is very difficult in practice. 
The data of 6 fiscal years might not be sufficient for our analysis and the data of 13 fiscal years 
have shortcomings of that the time series of the data is broken in the middle of the analysis period. 
However, government financial data are scarcely revised in the IFS books that are published early, and are 
actively revised in the recently printed IFS books, which is seen in Figure 1.4. If we include additional 
data published before 2000 to our analysis, the number of observations and periods will just increase, but 
it will not be expected that estimation results that differ from those in this paper will be derived from this 
expanded data. Furthermore, since data reports and revisions are expected to be facilitated especially in 
the less developed countries, new policy implications will be found according to the accumulation of 
government financial data in the future.     
We compare only initially-released closing data (nowcast) to finally-revised data (backcast). 
However, the analysis of the discrepancy between budgetary data (forecast) and initially-released closing 
24 
 
data (nowcast), as seen in Beetsma et al. (2011) and Ley et al. (2014), provides implications on the 
optimistic behaviors of the government. If we included budgetary balance in our analysis, we might find 
new implications on the financial management of the government.       
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Chapter 1 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 1.1 Data Structure and Application of the GFSM to the IFS Government Financial Data 
  
Fiscal 
year 
Old GFSM application New GFSM application # of 
years 
(books) 
’00 
(4) 
’01 
(4) 
’02 
(4) 
’03 
(4) 
’04 
(4) 
’05 
(4) 
’06 
(4) 
’07 
(2) 
’07 
(2) 
’08 
(4) 
’09 
(4) 
’10 
(4) 
’11 
(4) 
’12 
(2) 
1999               
7 
(28/0) 
2000               
6.5 
(26/0) 
2001               
5.5 
(22/0) 
2002               
4.5 
(18/0) 
2003               
3.5 
(14/0) 
2004               
2.5 
(10/0) 
2005               
1.5 
(6/20) 
2006               
5 
(0/20) 
2007               
4.5 
(0/18) 
2008               
3.5 
(0/14) 
2009               
2.5 
(0/10) 
2010               
1.5 
(0/6) 
2011               
0.5 
(0/2) 
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Table 1.2 Summary of Reporting Balance among Countries 
 
Fiscal years analyzed 
 
 2006~2011 (After new GFSM) 
6 years, 20 books (Sep. 2007~Jun. 2012) 
1999~2006 (Before new GFSM) 
8 years, 30 books (Mar. 2000~Jun. 2007) 
Countries 
All 
countries 
(188) 
Developed 
countries 
(31) 
Less 
developed  
(157) 
All 
countries 
(188) 
Developed 
countries 
(31) 
Less 
developed  
(157) 
Number of countries to 
report  
126  
(67.0%)                                   
29
38
 
(93.5%) 
97 
(61.8%)
121  
(64.4%)                                   
22
39
 
(71.0%)
99 
(63.1%)
Number of fiscal years 
to report  
3.23 in 6 
(53.9%) 
5.29 in 6 
(88.2%) 
2.83 in 6 
(47.1%) 
3.24 in 8 
(40.5%) 
3.77 in 8 
(47.2%) 
3.13 in 8 
(39.2%) 
Time lag of reporting
40
 
 
 4.11 
quarters
41
                              
2.81 
quarters                              
4.60 
quarters 
 4.28 
quarters                          
3.75 
quarters                              
4.40 
quarters  
Correlation b/w time 
lag and number of 
fiscal years to report 
-0.4399 
(p-value: 
0.0000)                 
-0.5556 
(p-value: 
0.0000)                  
-0.3632 
(p-value: 
0.0000)                  
-0.2833 
(p-value: 
0.0000)            
-0.4319 
(p-value: 
0.0000)              
-0.2618 
(p-value: 
0.0000)                  
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 2 advanced economies which did not report during the new GFSM period: San Marino, New Zealand 
  
39
 9 advanced economies which did not report during the old GFSM period: Austria, France, Germany, San Marino, 
Luxembourg, Japan, Malta, Portugal, Hong Kong 
  
40
 Average time lag of reporting among countries to report balance 
 
41
 (i.e.) Balance in fiscal year 2006 is reported in the IFS book published in December 2007 (after 4 quarters) or 
March 2008 (after 5 quarters) averagely. 
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Table 1.3 Summary of Revision among Countries which Report Balances 
 
Fiscal years analyzed 
 
2006~2011 (After new GFSM) 
6 years, 20 books (Sep. 2007~Jun. 2012) 
1999~2006 (Before new GFSM) 
8 years, 30 books (Mar. 2000~Jun. 2007) 
Countries 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less 
developed 
All 
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less 
developed  
Number of countries to 
revise / not to revise 
94 / 32 
(75:25) 
27 / 2
42
 
(93:7) 
67 / 30 
(69:31) 
75 / 46 
(62:38) 
15 / 7 
(68:32)  
60 / 39 
(61:39)  
Number of fiscal years 
to revise  
 
1.54 
(in 3.23
43
, 
47.5%) 
4.00 
(in 5.29, 
75.6%) 
1.05 
(in 2.83, 
37.2%) 
1.26 
(in 3.24, 
38.9%) 
1.61 
(in 3.77, 
42.7%) 
1.19 
(in 3.13, 
38.0%) 
Size of revisions 
(% of GDP) 
-0.249 -0.624 -0.105 -0.009 -0.068 -0.005 
Time lag of revision 
after initial report  
2.98  
quarters 
1.97  
quarters 
3.70  
quarters 
4.66  
quarters 
4.54 
quarters 
4.69 
quarters 
Correlation between 
time lag of reporting 
and revision 
0.0861 
(p-value: 
0.1390) 
0.3504 
(p-value: 
0.0001) 
0.0173 
(p-value: 
0.8208) 
0.1135 
(p-value: 
0.0813) 
0.2034 
(p-value: 
0.1565) 
0.0881 
(p-value: 
0.2306) 
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 2 advanced economies which did not revise during the new GFSM period: Switzerland, Hong Kong 
 
43
 The number of fiscal years to report 
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Table 1.4 Size of Revisions in Balance/GDP (%) and the Number of Countries            
according to Sign of the Revisions in Fiscal Years 
 
Fiscal years 
analyzed 
2006~2011 (After new GFSM) 
6 years, 20 books (Sep. 2007~Jun. 2012) 
1999~2006 (Before new GFSM) 
8 years, 30 books (Mar. 2000~Jun. 2007) 
Countries 
All  
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less 
developed 
All  
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less 
developed  
1999 Mean    0.012 -0.161 0.053 
 (+/-/0)
44
    (21/31/63) (1/6/15) (20/25/48) 
2000 Mean    0.226 -0.046 0.287 
 (+/-/0)    (20/20/64) (4/6/9) (16/14/55) 
2001 Mean    -0.464 -0.227 -0.513 
 (+/-/0)    (12/24/56) (2/5/9) (10/19/47) 
2002 Mean    0.068 0.010 0.082 
 (+/-/0)    (21/9/46) (6/1/8) (15/8/38) 
2003 Mean    0.029 -0.081 0.055 
 (+/-/0)    (16/17/34) (3/3/7) (13/14/27) 
2004 Mean    0.063 -0.041 0.088 
 (+/-/0)    (14/8/36) (3/4/4) (11/4/32) 
2005 Mean    0.030 0.120 0.007 
 (+/-/0)    (8/7/39) (2/2/7) (6/5/32) 
2006 Mean -0.166 -0.714 0.008 -0.007 0.010 -0.013 
 (+/-/0) (37/31/52) (13/11/5) (24/20/47) (1/1/34) (1/0/9) (0/1/25) 
2007 Mean -0.234 -0.844 -0.028    
 (+/-/0) (33/34/48) (13/14/2) (20/20/46)    
2008 Mean -0.556 -1.573 -0.218    
 (+/-/0) (21/40/51) (9/18/1) (12/22/50)    
2009 Mean -0.288 -0.485 -0.217    
 (+/-/0) (15/37/53) (8/17/3) (7/20/50)    
2010 Mean -0.070 0.015 -0.105    
 (+/-/0) (21/16/55) (13/8/6) (8/8/49)    
2011 Mean -0.031 0.000 -0.062    
 (+/-/0) (1/1/45) (0/0/23) (1/1/22)    
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 +/-/0 mean the number of countries to revise balance positively, negatively and not to revise them respectively. 
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Table 1.5 Size of Revisions in Revenue/GDP (%) and Expenditure/GDP (%) in Fiscal Years 
 
Fiscal years 
analyzed 
2006~2011 (After new GFSM) 
6 years, 20 books (Sep. 2007~Jun. 2012) 
1999~2006 (Before new GFSM) 
8 years, 30 books (Mar. 2000~Jun. 2007) 
Countries 
All  
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less 
developed 
All  
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less 
developed  
Rev 1999    0.041 -0.118 0.082 
 2000    -0.032 -0.084 -0.019 
 2001    -0.090 -0.220 -0.056 
 2002    0.119 0.128 0.116 
 2003    0.082 0.133 0.067 
 2004    -0.227 0.142 -0.337 
 2005    -0.147 0.000 -0.201 
 2006 0.288 0.177 0.320 . . . 
 2007 0.083 -0.060 0.128    
 2008 0.064 -0.079 0.110    
 2009 -0.147 -0.166 -0.140    
 2010 0.065 0.100 0.047    
 2011 0.002 0.000 0.003    
Exp 1999    0.247 0.141 0.275 
 2000    0.060 0.070 0.058 
 2001    0.033 -0.115 0.068 
 2002    0.068 0.128 0.052 
 2003    -0.179 -0.217 -0.168 
 2004    0.022 0.207 -0.027 
 2005    0.033 0.000 0.043 
 2006 0.206 0.520 0.112 . . . 
 2007 0.121 0.156 0.109    
 2008 0.127 0.607 -0.037    
 2009 0.161 -0.024 0.231    
 2010 0.296 0.536 0.170    
 2011 0.110 0.000 0.121    
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Table 1.6 Data and Variables 
 
 Variable Description Source 
Dep. 
Var. 
Report and revision 
i) Report or not    
= 1, if a country reports balance in a given fiscal 
year 
= 0, otherwise 
ii) Time lag of reporting 
Measurement of how long the government takes 
to report balance after the end of a fiscal year  
iii) Size of revisions 
Measurement of how much the government 
revises initial balance later, or discrepancy 
between last balance and initial balance   
IMF, International 
Financial Statistics 
Indep. 
Var. 
Rule of law 
Perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, 
and in particular the quality of contract 
enforcement, property rights, the police, and the 
courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and 
violence (range: -2.5~2.5) 
World Bank, 
Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Legislative electoral 
competition 
Legislative indices of electoral competitiveness 
(range: 1 (weakest) ~ 7 (strongest)) 
World Bank, Database 
of Political Institutions 
Executive electoral 
competition 
Executive indices of electoral competitiveness 
(range: 1 (weakest) ~ 7 (strongest)) 
World Bank, Database 
of Political Institutions 
Population Log of population  
World Bank, World 
Development Indicator 
Rents from natural 
resources 
Total natural resources (oil, natural gas, coal, 
mineral and forest) rents (% of GDP)  
World Bank, World 
Development Indicator 
Corruption control 
Perceptions of the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as 
"capture" of the state by elites and private 
interests (range: -2.5~2.5) 
World Bank, 
Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Size of cabinet Number of ministers in the cabinet 
Cross-National 
Time-Series Data  
GDP per capita 
Log of GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2005 
international $) 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicator 
Bureaucratic quality 
Institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy (range: 0 (worst) ~ 4 (best)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
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Table 1.6 (cont.) 
 
Indep. 
Var. 
Election in next year 
Previous year of election (legislature and 
executive) 
World Bank, Database 
of Political Institutions 
Ethnic-linguistic 
fractionalization 
Index to measure the probability that two 
randomly selected people from a given country 
will not belong to the same ethno-linguistic group 
(range: 0(0%, not fractionalized)~10(100%, 
perfectly fractionalized))  
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Presidential regime 
= 1, if a country has presidential political system, 
= 0, otherwise 
World Bank, Database 
of Political Institutions 
Fiscal rule Number of numerical fiscal rules (range: 0~5) 
IMF, Fiscal rules 
dataset 
Real GDP growth 
Annual change in estimated GDP at constant 
prices (%) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Inflation 
Inflation as measured by the consumer price 
index (annual, %) 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicator 
Democratic 
accountability 
Measurement on how responsive the government 
is to its people (not just whether there are free and 
fair elections) 
(range: 0 (least) ~ 6 (most responsive)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Government 
effectiveness 
Perceptions of the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and the degree of its  
independence from political pressures, the quality 
of policy formulation and implementation, and 
the credibility of the government's commitment to 
such policies (range: -2.5~2.5) 
World Bank, 
Worldwide 
Governance Indicators 
Total foreign assets  
and liabilities 
Summation of equity, FDI, debt instruments 
(loans, deposits, trade credit), financial 
derivatives, reserve asset that domestic people 
own in foreign countries and foreigners own in 
this country, respectively  
External Wealth of 
Nations Mark II 
Database (Lane and 
Milesi-Ferrretti) 
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Table 1.7 Summary Statistics 
 
Fiscal years analyzed 2006~2011 (After new GFSM) 1999~2006 (Before new GFSM) 
Countries 
All  
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less  
developed  
All  
countries 
Developed 
countries 
Less  
developed  
Rule of law 0.17 1.48 -0.32 0.00 1.45 -0.33 
Legislative electoral competition 6.42 6.97 6.29 6.26 6.97 6.10 
Executive electoral competition 6.14 6.97 5.95 6.02 6.97 5.79 
Population (millions) 40.2 31.4 42.2 37.4 30.2 39.1 
Total foreign assets (of GDP) 1.87 7.02 0.87 1.38 5.01 0.66 
Total foreign liabilities (of GDP) 2.09 7.04 1.14 1.78 4.96 1.17 
Rents from natural resources  8.96 1.55 10.71 8.13 1.24 9.77 
Control of corruption 0.04 1.51 -0.30 0.03 1.57 -0.33 
Size of cabinet 23.3 20.9 23.8 23.2 21.6 23.5 
GDP per capita (ppp) 13,609 33,931 8,776 11,879 31,086 7,386 
Bureaucratic quality 2.20 3.68 1.78 2.19 3.71 1.76 
Election in next year 0.30 0.33 0.29 0.27 0.31 0.26 
Ethnic-linguistic fractionalization 3.26 1.50 3.74 3.26 1.50 3.74 
Presidential regime (%) 0.56 0.10 0.67 0.56 0.12 0.66 
Number of fiscal rules  1.95 2.43 1.69 1.53 2.28 1.13 
Real GDP growth (%) 3.43 1.34 4.15 3.20 2.59 3.41 
Inflation (%) 33.4 2.4 40.9 10.4 2.2 12.4 
Democratic accountability 4.18 5.66 3.77 3.95 5.50 3.51 
Government effectiveness 0.08 1.49 -0.25 0.06 1.55 -0.29 
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Table 1.8 Estimation Results of the Determinants on Reporting or Non-Reporting               
in Fiscal Year 2007 
 
Reporting or non-reporting  
in fiscal year 2007 
(1) 
All 
countries 
 
(2) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
(3) 
All 
countries 
 
(4) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
(5) 
All 
countries 
 
(6) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
Rule of law 
 
0.453** 0.482** 0.229 0.151 0.253 0.086 
(0.183) (0.228) (0.193) (0.251) (0.161) (0.247) 
Legislative electoral 
competitiveness 
0.234* 0.245** 0.326*** 0.348*** 0.314** 0.336*** 
(0.123) (0.125) (0.126) (0.123) (0.124) (0.120) 
Executive electoral 
competitiveness 
-0.178* -0.185* -0.201* -0.215** -0.218** -0.232** 
(0.106) (0.107) (0.110) (0.107) (0.111) (0.108) 
Population 
 
0.301*** 0.301*** 0.317*** 0.299*** 0.453*** 0.402*** 
(0.086) (0.097) (0.085) (0.098) (0.116) (0.124) 
Financial Openness 
 
0.098 0.055 0.144* 0.044 0.117* 0.048 
(0.066) (0.081) (0.080) (0.081) (0.070) (0.079) 
Natural resources rents 
 
-0.016** -0.016** -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Natural resources 
rents*corruption control 
  
0.026** 0.029** 0.023** 0.028** 
  
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) 
Size of cabinet 
 
    
-0.060** -0.050* 
    
(0.024) (0.030) 
Constant 
 
-4.286*** -4.254*** -5.091*** -4.827*** -5.606*** -5.144*** 
(1.436) (1.604) (1.486) (1.658) (1.675) (1.733) 
Number of observations 148 119 148 119 147 119 
Adjusted R
2
 0.196 0.145 0.226 0.183 0.278 0.211 
 
Note: 1. Probit regression is used. 
     2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Table 1.9 Estimation Results of the Determinants on Reporting or Non-Reporting               
in Fiscal Years 2006~2011 
 
Reporting or non-reporting 
in fiscal years 2006~2011 
(1) 
All 
countries 
 
(2) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
(3) 
All 
countries 
 
(4) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
(5) 
All 
countries 
 
(6) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
Rule of law 
 
0.407*** 0.439*** 0.248*** 0.194** 0.234*** 0.147 
(0.062) (0.080) (0.070) (0.094) (0.068) (0.095) 
Legislative electoral 
competitiveness 
0.141*** 0.143*** 0.209*** 0.219*** 0.204*** 0.208*** 
(0.052) (0.053) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) (0.057) 
Executive electoral 
competitiveness 
-0.056 -0.061 -0.059 -0.069 -0.082* -0.091** 
(0.043) (0.044) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046) 
Population 
 
0.193*** 0.203*** 0.207*** 0.203*** 0.299*** 0.294*** 
(0.030) (0.034) (0.030) (0.034) (0.038) (0.042) 
Financial Openness 
 
0.083** 0.063* 0.114*** 0.063** 0.095*** 0.072** 
(0.033) (0.033) (0.037) (0.029) (0.034) (0.029) 
Natural resources rents 
 
-0.011*** -0.010*** 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Natural resources 
rents*corruption control 
  
0.021*** 0.023*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 
  
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Size of cabinet 
 
    
-0.042*** -0.041*** 
    
(0.008) (0.010) 
Constant 
 
-3.189*** -3.314*** -3.921*** -3.864*** -4.212*** -4.187*** 
(0.528) (0.572) (0.553) (0.589) (0.577) (0.606) 
Number of observations 883 709 883 709 877 709 
Adjusted R
2
 0.139 0.086 0.157 0.108 0.183 0.128 
 
Note: 1. Probit regression is used and year-indicator variables are included in the regression. 
     2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Table 1.10 Robustness Check of the Determinants on Reporting or Non-Reporting               
by using Fixed Effect of a Country and Average Value in Fiscal Years 2006~2011 
 
Fixed Effect of a Country 
on Reporting 
(1) 
All 
countries 
 
(2) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
(3) 
All 
countries 
 
(4) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
(5) 
All 
countries 
 
(6) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
Rule of law 
 
0.128*** 0.153*** 0.082*** 0.054 0.071** 0.044 
(0.031) (0.056) (0.031) (0.061) (0.030) (0.060) 
Legislative electoral 
competitiveness 
0.094** 0.091** 0.125*** 0.128*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 
(0.037) (0.038) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.034) 
Executive electoral 
competitiveness 
-0.046** -0.046** -0.051** -0.053** -0.060*** -0.060*** 
(0.023) (0.023) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) 
Population 
 
0.059*** 0.078*** 0.060*** 0.074*** 0.086*** 0.098*** 
(0.017) (0.020) (0.016) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 
Financial Openness 
 
0.003** 0.014 0.004*** 0.014 0.005*** 0.020 
(0.001) (0.021) (0.001) (0.022) (0.001) (0.024) 
Natural resources rents 
 
-0.508** -0.523** -0.088 0.015 -0.048 0.004 
(0.229) (0.237) (0.268) (0.303) (0.260) (0.299) 
Natural resources 
rents*corruption control 
  
0.670*** 0.822*** 0.597*** 0.707** 
  
(0.205) (0.261) (0.210) (0.275) 
Size of cabinet 
 
    
-0.012** -0.011* 
    
(0.005) (0.007) 
Constant 
 
-1.559*** -0.857** -1.761*** -1.031*** -1.830*** -1.085*** 
(0.330) (0.368) (0.309) (0.346) (0.318) (0.357) 
Number of observations 145 116 145 116 144 116 
Adjusted R
2
 0.246 0.200 0.280 0.248 0.317 0.267 
 
Note: 1. OLS regression is used. 
     2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Table 1.11 Estimation Results of the Determinants on Time Lag of Reporting                    
 
 
Time lag of reporting 
in fiscal year 2007 
Time lag of reporting 
in fiscal years 2006~2011 
 
(1) 
All 
countries 
 
(2) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
(3) 
All 
countries 
 
(4) 
Less 
developed 
countries 
GDP per capita 
 
-2.725*** -2.353** -2.257*** -1.960*** 
(0.946) (1.197) (0.465) (0.660) 
Bureaucratic quality 
 
-4.462* -2.272 -6.100*** -4.585** 
(2.350) (4.079) (1.183) (1.980) 
Interaction of above two 
variables 
0.395 0.094 0.564*** 0.357 
(0.254) (0.506) (0.124) (0.242) 
Election in next year 
 
-0.809 -2.679** -0.381 -0.625 
(0.760) (1.236) (0.315) (0.508) 
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization 
 
-4.512** -5.354* -3.353*** -3.736*** 
(2.270) (2.740) (0.832) (1.037) 
Presidential regime 
 
-2.321* -3.604** -0.675 -1.285** 
(1.233) (1.507) (0.463) (0.618) 
Constant 
 
33.558*** 33.026*** 27.518*** 26.203*** 
(8.304) (10.003) (4.150) (5.594) 
Number of observations 115 87 711 543 
 
Note: 1. Heckman sample selection is used. 
     2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Table 1.12 Estimation Results of Whether Revisions are Associated with Initial or Last Balance 
 
Size of revisions  
in fiscal years 2006~2011 
(1) 
All 
countries 
(2) 
Developed 
countries 
(3) 
Less 
developed 
(4) 
All 
countries 
(5) 
Developed 
countries 
(6) 
Less 
developed 
FE 
(c) 
Initial balance/GDP 
 
-0.198*** -0.206*** -0.196*** 
   
(0.021) (0.043) (0.023) 
   
Last balance/GDP 
 
   
0.046* 0.094* 0.030 
   
(0.024) (0.049) (0.028) 
Constant -0.005*** -0.010*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.004** -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Number of observations 591 164 427 591 164 427 
Number of countries 122 29 93 122 29 93 
FE 
(cy) 
Initial balance/GDP 
 
-0.237*** -0.298*** -0.229*** 
   
(0.023) (0.064) (0.025) 
   
Last balance/GDP 
 
   
0.068** 0.316*** 0.030 
   
(0.028) (0.063) (0.031) 
Constant -0.008*** -0.014*** -0.007*** 0.002 0.016*** -0.000 
 
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) 
Number of observations 591 164 427 591 164 427 
Number of countries 122 29 93 122 29 93 
 
Note: 1. FE(c): country fixed effects model, FE(cy): country-year fixed effects model   
     2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Table 1.13 Relationship between Initial Balance/GDP, Last Balance/GDP                         
and Time Lag of Reporting 
 
Last balance/GDP 
in fiscal years 2006~2011 
(1) 
All 
countries 
(2) 
Developed 
countries 
(3) 
Less developed 
countries 
Initial balance/GDP 0.518*** 1.109*** 0.486*** 
 
(0.038) (0.158) (0.039) 
log of report time lag 0.001 0.013 0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
Interaction 0.164*** -0.326*** 0.184*** 
 
(0.021) (0.118) (0.021) 
Constant -0.011*** -0.027** -0.008** 
 
(0.004) (0.012) (0.004) 
Number of observations 591 164 427 
Number of countries 122 29 93 
Adjusted R
2
 0.747 0.692 0.778 
 
Note: 1. Country-year fixed effects model is employed.   
     2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Table 1.14 Estimation Results of the Determinants in Revision of Fiscal Balance 
 
Size of revisions 
in fiscal years 2006~2011 
(1) 
All 
countries 
(2) 
Developed 
countries 
(3) 
Less developed 
countries 
Initial balance/GDP -0.287*** -0.490*** -0.056 
 
(0.034) (0.056) (0.035) 
Number of fiscal rules 0.268* 0.419** -0.011 
 
(0.153) (0.214) (0.130) 
Real GDP Growth (%) 0.083 -0.036 0.080* 
 
(0.055) (0.119) (0.042) 
Inflation (%) 0.030 0.459** 0.017 
 
(0.044) (0.182) (0.029) 
Democratic accountability -0.326 -0.960** -0.063 
 
(0.210) (0.420) (0.137) 
Government effectiveness 0.131 1.330* 0.171 
 
(0.277) (0.693) (0.286) 
Constant  0.006 -0.603 -0.075 
 
(1.163) (2.709) (0.796) 
Number of observations 233 125 108 
Number of countries 45 22 23 
 
Note: 1. Random effects model is used and year-indicator variables are included in the regression. 
     2. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Figure 1.1 Examples of Change of Balance/GDP (%) according to Publication Time 
 
a. The U.S.     b. Greece  
  
 
c. Slovenia     d. Egypt 
  
 
Note: Horizon axis is the time of publication. FY2006 stands for balance/GDP(%) of a fiscal year 2006.  
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Figure 1.2 Reports according to Fiscal Years 
 
a. Number of Countries to Report according to Fiscal Years 
 
Note: 1. “all”, “dev” and “less” stand for the all, the developed, and the less developed countries, respectively. 
     2. “before” and “after” means the period before and after new GFSM application to the IFS.     
 
b. Time Lag of Reporting according to Fiscal Years (Unit: Quarter) 
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Figure 1.3 Revisions according to Fiscal Years 
 
a. Number of Countries to Revise Balance according to Fiscal Years 
 
 
b. Size of Revisions in Balance/GDP (%) according to Fiscal Years 
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Figure 1.4 Number of Observations and Ratio of Revisions/Observations (%)             
according Publication Years 
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CHAPTER 2 
Cash or Accrual?:                                                
The Determinants of the Switch to Accrual Accounting for Fiscal Systems
45
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 Governments have traditionally used cash accounting. Since the early 1990s, a number of 
countries have been changing their governmental accounting system from a cash basis to an accrual basis. 
International agencies such as the IMF, the OECD and the IFAC
46
 have recommended that governments 
adopt accrual accounting. According to a recent survey of PwC (2013), accounting systems among 
governments are diverse but the trend towards accrual accounting
47
 is clear. 
 However, many governments still employ cash accounting because it is easily understandable 
and it is useful for controlling government's financial activities such as budgetary execution. Nevertheless, 
researchers like Athukorala et al. (2003) point out weaknesses in cash accounting. For instance, it 
comprehends only cash information and provides basic information such as in/outflow of cash. Hence, 
cash accounting only offers a limited basis for fiscal strategy decision-making, and accountability, as 
compared to accrual accounting. Some governments began to reform their accounting to an accrual basis. 
 Though there is a dispute on the effectiveness of accrual accounting in practice, many 
accounting experts, governments and international agencies argue that accrual accounting produces more 
relevant information and improves transparency and responsibility of the government (Blöndal, 2003). A 
survey of PwC (2013) suggests that many governments think that greater transparency and accountability, 
a comprehensive inventory of assets and liabilities, and improved performance assessment are main 
benefits from accrual accounting adoption. Guthrie (1998) indicates that accrual accounting improves 
comparability of the financial performance between jurisdictions and provides greater accountability for 
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 This chapter is a joint work with Professor Hadi Salehi Esfahani. 
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 A cash accounting is ‘an accounting that recognizes transactions and other events only when cash is received or 
paid’ (IFAC, 2008: 926). Accrual accounting is ‘an accounting under which transactions and other events are 
recognized when they occur (and not only when cash or its equivalent is received or paid). Therefore the 
transactions and events are recorded in the accounting records and recognized in the financial statements of the 
periods to which they relate’ (IFAC, 2008: 32–3). 
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public resources, as financial data become more transparent. Chan (2003) suggests that the accrual basis 
and government-wide reporting are preferable for the clear disclosure of government finance.  
 In spite of these benefits, not all governments have changed or consider changing their 
accounting to an accrual basis. Sometimes, different governmental accounting systems are employed 
among countries that seem to share similar features such as economic development, geographical location, 
or legal system (e.g. while the French government and the Austrian government adopted accrual 
accounting in 2006 and 2013 respectively, the German government has kept cash accounting until now 
and has no plan for governmental accounting reform). 
 Against this background, we will investigate in this paper what factors drive the government’s 
choice between keeping cash accounting and adoption of accrual accounting, or, more broadly, what leads 
to governmental accounting reform among countries? Also, we will find out whether these determinants 
differ between the developed countries and the less developed countries. 
 We discover which country adopted accrual accounting from the data of the OECD's 
"International Budget Practices and Procedures Database" in 2007/2008 and the IMF's "Government 
Finance Statistics yearbook" published in recent years. We also catch the time of the adoption from 
information available in international agencies, ministries of finance, and previous literature as well as 
both the OECD and the IMF data. Consequently, we find that while 21 countries have employed accrual 
accounting and 16 countries are shifting their governmental accounting system to an accrual basis, 90 
countries are still using cash accounting among 127 countries in 2012.  
However, the data of 88 countries among 127 countries from 1989 to 2012 are used in this paper 
because of restricted availabilities of the data of other variables. 35 countries out of 88 have adopted or 
are adopting accrual accounting and 53 countries use cash accounting. In addition, the data for political, 
economic, social and institutional determinants that influence the adoption of accrual accounting are 
obtained from surveys of international agencies, research institutes and previous literature to compare 
characteristics among countries.  
 The literature employs logistic regression to find the determinants of governmental accounting 
change. However, we apply survival analysis in order to catch them more strictly. We use logistic 
regression in checking the robustness of estimation results from survival analysis. Also, we include 
interaction terms of several determinants with development level of a country in our regression in order to 
investigate how the impact of these determinants differs according to development level. We certify 
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estimation results from regression with interaction terms through separate regressions for the developed 
countries and the less developed counties. 
 We show that governmental accounting decisions are affected by several characteristics of a 
country, and these characteristics give different impact persuant to the development level of the country. 
In other words, determinants such as GDP per capita and democratic accountability facilitate the adoption 
consistently in all countries, but others influence it differently according to development level. Political 
competition, common law tradition, spread of accrual accounting among other governments and rule of 
law contribute to adopting accrual accounting early in developed countries. However, bureaucratic quality, 
education, and economic stability enhance the adoption more significantly in less developed countries. 
 The empirical literature on the determinants of governmental accounting reform is restricted to 
case studies of several governments or statistical research at the local government level. Therefore, this 
paper becomes the first trial to investigate factors of accrual accounting adoption empirically by 
comparing many central governments, which contributes to filling gaps created by the limitations of using 
case studies and descriptive analysis in the previous literature. Also, this paper provides worthwhile 
implications for the relationship between government reform and development by analyzing how factors 
of accrual accounting adoption affect countries differently, depending on development level or GDP per 
capita.  
 We will introduce the literature on this topic in the second section, and explain our model and 
hypothesis in the third section. The data and variables will be suggested in the fourth section. The 
estimation strategies and results will be shown in the fifth and sixth section respectively. We will deliver 
our conclusion in the last section. 
 
2.2  Existing Literature 
 Research on the determinants of governmental accounting reform has been developed from 
Lüder (1992), who used case studies on Canada, Germany, Denmark, the European Community, France, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States (federal and state government) in the mid to late 
1980s and early 1990s (Caba-Perez et al., 2009; Upping et al., 2011). His contingency model gives a 
starting point for thinking about the determinants and has been cited frequently in the literature. He argues 
that the adoption of a new accounting system depends on a combination of favorable and unfavorable 
conditions. He includes both institutional conditions and collective behaviors as determinants, and 
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classifies them into four categories according to their functions in the adoption process: i) stimuli (factors 
to initiate government accounting reforms) such as financial problems of the government, ii) social 
structural variables (characteristics of users of information) such as income and education level, iii) 
structural variables of the politico-administrative system (features of producers of information) such as 
administrative culture and political competition, and iv) implementation barriers (environmental 
conditions) such as legal systems. His research is summarized in Table 2.1.  
 Lüder’s contingency model has been applied to and revised in many studies (Godfrey et al., 1996, 
2001; Yamamoto, 1999; Christensen, 2002; Oliorilanto, 2008; Upping et al., 2011). These use similar 
determinants in a different structure. For instance, Christensen (2002) emphasizes the importance of key 
actors of accounting reform. So he classifies determinants into three groups of actors such as promoters of 
change, users of information, producers of information as well as stimuli and implementation barriers. 
Upping et al. (2011) construct the adapted accounting change model and classify factors into 4 groups: 
external pressure, internal pressure, facilitators of change and barriers to change. 
 However, there is a limitation in the fact that previous research is mostly theoretical or case 
studies.
48
 Lüder (2009) points out a problem with the use of case studies and calls for statistical research 
on this topic. He emphasizes that statistical research reveals the relationship between accounting system 
and environment of the government better than a case study does, and case studies are often strictly 
descriptive, poorly structured, and pure desk studies without empirical basis. Nevertheless, only a small 
number of papers, investigating the determinants of government accounting reform statistically, have 
been found and they stay at the level of local government. An empirical study comparing many central 
governments has not been seen. Therefore, this paper will be the first attempt at investigating the 
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 Lüder (1992) argues that empirical or statistical analysis on this topic is not proper because 
i) the relationship between government accounting and candidate independent variables (determinants) may not be 
mono-causal but multi-causal, and independent variables may have an additional effect on each other 
(multicollinearity),  
ii) since the candidate independent variables are frequently difficult to measure directly, it is thus necessary to 
operationalize them by means of observable and measurable proxies, and 
iii) it also seems questionable whether the use or non-use of the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
can really be conceived of as a binary variable at all.  
However, he changes his attitude in his following paper and emphasizes the importance of statistical study on this 
topic (Lüder, 2009).  
Also, as accrual accounting of governments is in the spotlight, many surveys on this topic have been done by 
international agencies and global research institutes. So we can construct a reliable dataset by using a variety of 
sources and make the initial step to find the determinants of governmental accounting reform empirically.  
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determinants of accounting reform among many central governments quantitatively. 
 A few papers propose that various institutions and characteristics influence the adoption of a 
new governmental accounting system. Carpenter (1991) investigates the factors that influence the 
selection of a new accounting system, GAAP among the state governments in the US, and suggests that 
strong political competition leads the state governments to adopt the GAAP. Carvalho et al. (2007) and 
Anessi-Pessina et al. (2008) look for determinants of accrual accounting in the local governments in 
Portugal and Italy, respectively. Carvalho et al. (2007) show that differences in accrual accounting 
adoption across municipalities are explained by population size, financial conditions, urban characteristics 
(metropolis), and diffusion of accrual accounting across neighboring municipalities. Anessi-Pessina et al. 
(2008) propose a different view that cultural factors like CFO perceptions and geographic location are 
much more important in the adoption of accrual accounting. These papers employ logistic regression or 
simple OLS as an empirical methodology. Empirical studies at the local government level are 
summarized in Table 2.2.  
In addition, the literature does not pay attention to the fact that the effects of the determinants 
can change in line with fundamental characteristics of a country. It does not seem to be natural that all 
countries with different features have the same determinants.  
 
2.3  Model and Hypothesis  
 We revise the contingency model of Lüder (1992) which is a fundamental model on this topic, 
and investigate the determinants of accrual accounting adoption or governmental accounting reform. First, 
since the government decides whether it will change its accounting system, characteristics of the 
government definitely influence the adoption. However, policy decision of the government is affected by 
interaction with people and environmental conditions. Therefore, we consider features of people and 
environments as well as the government to be the determinants and classify them into 4 categories:  
determinants i) to stimulate reform, ii) to influence the willingness of the government to reform, iii) to 
affect the capability of the government to reform, and iv) to be related to environmental advantage or 
disadvantage. Our extended contingency model is shown in Figure 2.1.  
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2.3.1  Stimulus for Government Accounting Reform 
 Whenever the government initiates reform, there will naturally be a reason or stimulus for it.  
An economic or fiscal crisis is a possible stimulus for governmental accounting reform. According to 
Guthrie (1998), the government that suffers an economic or fiscal crisis, such as a huge deficit and debt, 
is inclined to adopt accrual accounting as one of many governmental reforms to respond to the crisis. For 
instance, New Zealand, the UK and Korea experienced the IMF bail-out program, which influenced the 
adoption of accrual accounting. Also, Kasurinen (2002) suggests that financial soundness of the 
government diminishes the priority for change. However, since governmental reform might worsen the 
crisis by giving more complexity, economic stability may be a more suitable condition for changing 
governmental accounting. 
(Hypothesis 1) An economic or fiscal crisis stimulates governmental accounting reform. Conversely, 
economic stability can be helpful for reform in certain situations. 
2.3.2  Willingness of the Government to Reform 
 Why is the government willing to change its operations in spite of the cost from the reform? If 
the reform makes the government to operate efficiently and obtain political support from people, the 
government will create bigger rent from it. The willingness of the government to reform is therefore 
affected by characteristics of not only the government but also the people, because people decide political 
support for the government. We suggest that features of the government such as bureaucratic quality, 
democratic accountability and characteristics of the people such as education and population are regarded 
as the determinants of accrual accounting adoption. Rule of law and political competition are considered 
as features of both the government and people that influence accrual accounting adoption. 
 As for bureaucratic quality, two contradictory explanations are proposed. The first explanation 
argues that countries with better administrative quality are more inclined to adopt accrual accounting. 
PwC (2013) mentions that since application of accrual accounting to the government is more complex 
than that of cash accounting, administrative quality of the government is needed. However, a different 
assertion is suggested, namely that as administrative quality is improved, the government will not adopt 
accrual accounting. According to Political Risk Services (2013), when the government has great 
bureaucratic quality, this bureaucracy becomes somewhat autonomous from political pressure and might 
resist governmental reform because of the burden of implementing the reform.  
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(Hypothesis 2) High bureaucratic quality in the government contributes to adopting accrual 
accounting. However, it might not in a certain country. 
 We can expect that a democratically accountable government prefers to improve its operation 
system in order to reflect the people's desire and thus gain more political agreement. Also, the literature 
such as de Renzio (2009) and de Renzio et al. (2010) shows that countries with greater level of 
democracy have a tendency to reform their public finance management to which the shift to accrual 
accounting belongs.  
(Hypothesis 3) Democratic accountability encourages the government to reform its accounting 
system. 
 Since educated people can understand complicated fiscal information, they prefer transitioning 
to a more informative accounting system and accrual accounting is more likely to be adopted. Gariyo 
(2000) suggests, in the example of Uganda, that the citizens do not have the ability to influence the 
budgetary process because the mechanisms of fiscal management are too complex and require skills and 
knowledge unavailable to the people. Also, the World Bank (2002) indicates that tertiary education in the 
less developed countries assists the improvement of institutional regimes. As suggested by the World 
Bank (2002), education might be more influential in the less developed than in the developed ones. 
(Hypothesis 4) Educated people are more likely to prefer accrual accounting especially in the less 
developed countries. 
 The effect of population on the reform is not coherent in the literature. On one hand, since 
population is a proxy for national wealth or personnel power which plays a role of providing resources to 
implement the reform, it enhances accrual accounting adoption. On the other hand, since a larger 
population makes administration more complicated, the government should bear increased costs from the 
reform and will be prevented from adopting accrual accounting. While population encourages accrual 
accounting adoption in Carvalho et al. (2007), it discourages in Carpenter (1991) and Anessi-Pessina et al. 
(2008). Since we classify population as a feature of people in this paper, we hypothesize that population 
enhances the adoption of accrual accounting. 
(Hypothesis 5) Population facilitates accrual accounting adoption by the government. 
 Rule of law assesses development of the legal system and law observance by the people, and it 
reflects features of both the government and people. If legal institutions are well established and people 
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follow the law, the government will change its accounting system easily. Unger (2002) proposes that rule 
of law along with democracy becomes a ground for effective reform. However, rule of law possibly slows 
down the process of change because it takes time to satisfy every legal procedure. Furthermore, making 
political agreement is usually difficult in the less developed countries. Actions of the government beyond 
the law might speed up governmental reform in the less developed countries.  
(Hypothesis 6) Rule of law facilitates the adoption of accrual accounting but might be an obstacle in 
the less developed countries.    
 The political process influences governmental accounting systems in Kido et al. (2012) and Van 
Lent (2012). When politicians or parties have similar opportunities to win the election, political 
competition becomes stronger. Under strong political competition, an incumbent cannot be certain of 
holding the current position and he/she wants to bind behaviors of opposite politicians or parties in the 
future in order to protect his political rents (Persson et al., 2002). Accrual accounting provides more 
detailed fiscal information and helps binding behavior of opposite politician or party. Therefore, as 
political competition is intensified, incumbents of the government prefer accrual accounting.  
(Hypothesis 7) Strong political competition encourages the government to adopt accrual accounting. 
2.3.3  Capability of the Government to Reform 
 Though the government is willing to reform its operations, the reform cannot be implemented 
without sufficient capability of the government. Many governments in the less developed countries want 
to propel reforms in order to improve their operation, but they frequently fail because of insufficient 
capability in financial, administrative and personnel resources. Therefore, not only willingness but also 
capability of the government becomes a crucial condition for governmental accounting reform.  
 GDP per capita is a representative proxy of capability and it is regarded as a constraint especially 
for the less developed countries. According to Allen (2009), low and middle income countries have 
insufficient financial resources to spend on necessary technical systems and capacity building for 
strengthening budgetary processes and systems. Also, Ingram (1984) suggests that if the wealth of a 
province or a country increases, policy makers or politicians will have incentive to show it and argue to 
expand disclosure of fiscal information in order to obtain more political support. 
(Hypothesis 8) An increase of GDP per capita forwards adoption of accrual accounting. 
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2.3.4  Advantages and Disadvantages of Environment 
 When the environment around the government is advantageous for the reform, government 
reform will be initiated and implemented easily. We propose legal tradition and spread of accrual 
accounting among governments as environmental determinants that influence the adoption.  
 Legal systems in the world are classified broadly into two groups; Anglo-Saxon, or common law, 
and continental, or civil law. This legal tradition has affected various institutions (La Porta et al., 1999) 
and governmental accounting systems have also been developed in accordance with it. Governmental 
accounting under common law tradition emphasizes records of practical transaction, and uses double 
entry book-keeping and financial statements similar to those in the private sector. However, governmental 
accounting in the civil law tradition focuses on records of cash transaction and control of expenditures, 
and uses single entry book-keeping and relatively simple financial statements. Also, accrual accounting in 
the government began in countries with common law tradition like New Zealand and the UK historically. 
Hence, it can be expected that accrual accounting is harmonized with a common law system. 
(Hypothesis 9) Common law tradition makes a favorable environment for accrual accounting 
adoption. 
 If more countries change their governmental accounting to an accrual basis, accrual accounting 
adoption will improve financial management from the increased harmonization with institutions of other 
countries and standards of international agencies. Also, this policy trend among the governments can be 
interpreted as a signal that accrual accounting is an advanced system and improves government 
performance. Therefore, we argue that the diffusion of accrual accounting among countries has a positive 
impact on the adoption, as seen in Carvalho et al. (2007).  
(Hypothesis 10) An increase of governments to adopt accrual accounting enhances the adoption in   
the other governments. 
2.3.5  Interaction with Development Level 
 Thus far we have looked into the determinants that influence the adoption of accrual accounting. 
However, we wonder that these factors affect governments uniformly irrespective of different 
characteristics of governments. For instance, can education level affect governmental reform identically 
between the developed countries and the less developed countries, even though most people in the 
developed countries are educated above a certain level such as secondary school? Institutional reform 
53 
 
differs according to development (Andrews, 2013) and fiscal institution reform is likely to be slow in the 
less developed countries since the budget is especially prone to rent-seeking influence (North, 1991; 
North et al., 2006). Hence, we suppose that the influential direction or strength of determinants can 
change according to the development level such as GDP per capita of a country. 
(Hypothesis 11) The impact of the determinants differs according to the development level of a 
country. 
 
2.4 Data and Variables 
 In order to investigate the determinants of accrual accounting adoption among governments, we 
have to know which government shifted its accounting system from cash to accrual. However, since some 
governments have adopted accrual accounting partially and sequentially, and transition from cash 
accounting to accrual accounting usually takes several years, whether the government adopts accrual 
accounting or not is not always coherent among related sources. Therefore, clear and consistent criteria 
for labeling the act of adoption are needed, and we employ two sources as fundamental criteria. 
 Our criteria for determining the adoption are the OECD's "International Budget Practices and 
Procedures Database" in 2007/2008 and the IMF's "Government Finance Statistics Yearbook" published 
in recent years. We regard them as more reliable sources than others because i) they are based on a decent 
survey that is administered by the OECD with the World Bank and on government reports to the IMF, ii) 
they are cited recurrently in the literature, iii) they encompass information from many countries (97 
countries in the OECD's database, 143 in the IMF's) and iv) they look into the adoption of accrual 
accounting more clearly than the other sources.
49
 Nonetheless, in cases where they are significantly 
different from other sources, we review them thoroughly by using additional information found in 
international agencies, the Ministry of Finance of a country, the literature, etc. Also, it is important for our 
analysis to know when the government changed accounting systems from a cash basis to an accrual basis. 
We find this information from additional sources that are mentioned above as well as two primary data 
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 The OECD database casts a question "on what reporting basis are the budget and financial statements presented 
to the Legislature?" and collects answers of cash, accrual or other accounting. The IMF GFS contains information 
on cash or non-cash accounting. Both also include some comment on governmental accounting such as plan or 
degree of transit to accrual accounting. However, other sources depend on the discretion of researchers, rather than 
the judgment of the government and do not suggest a detailed description on which accounting system is employed 
currently. 
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sources.
50
  
 We investigate 127 counties consequently, as seen in Table 2.3. Since the New Zealand 
government adopted accrual accounting in 1992, 21 countries have employed accrual accounting and 16 
countries are changing their government accounting system to an accrual basis. However, 90 countries are 
still using cash accounting in 2012. OECD member countries, IMF advanced economies and EU member 
countries are shown to be more inclined to adopt accrual accounting as seen in Table 2.4. However, 88 
countries are included in our sample because of the restricted availability of data that stand for a country's 
features like 'rule of law,' 'education,' etc. Among 37 countries which have begun to adopt accrual 
accounting substantially, Chile and Estonia are excluded from our sample. Hence, 35 countries are 
classified as countries that have completely adopted or started to significantly adopt accrual accounting 
and 53 countries belong to a group that has kept cash accounting. Our sample in survival analysis starts 
from 1989 when New Zealand initiated the transit to accrual accounting and ends in 2012. The countries 
included in our sample are also seen in Table 2.3. 
 As seen in Table 2.3, while some countries have already adopted accrual accounting, other 
countries are adopting it now. What criterion can be used for determining the moment of accrual 
accounting adoption? The most crucial criterion for judging accrual accounting reform is substantial 
initiation and implementation rather than completion of transit to accrual accounting, because policy 
decisions on reforming its accounting system are apparent at this time. When the government transfers 
from cash to accrual accounting, it generally follows a procedure similar to the following: (i) 
Announcement of plan on accrual accounting adoption → (ii) Establishment of an institute to set up new 
government accounting standards → (iii) Test of pilot project → (iv) Legislation → (v) Application of 
accrual accounting to individual ministries → (vi) Application of accrual accounting to entire ministries 
→ (vii) Release of consolidated financial statements based on accrual accounting. We recognize the 
stages of "legislation" and "accrual accounting in individual ministries" as evidence of substantial 
transition from cash to accrual accounting because the adoption is confirmed in and is never cancelled 
after these stages. Therefore, if a country's accrual accounting adoption proceeds beyond the stage (iv), 
we consider this country to adopt accrual accounting and give "1" to it from the year in which it arrives at 
the stage (iv) or (v). Otherwise, we consider that it still uses cash accounting and assign "0" to it. 
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paper too lengthy. However, we will send them according to reader's request. 
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 We find the time trend of accrual accounting adoption in Figure 2.2. While the portion of 
countries to adopt accrual accounting increases consistently pursuant to years, substantial implementation 
of the reform takes place in 2000s more frequently than in 1990s.    
 The data on factors that influence accrual accounting adoption are obtained from surveys by 
international agencies such as the World Bank, research institutes such as the Political Risk Services and 
previous literature such as La Porta et al. (1999). Among characteristics of the government and people 
that influence governmental accounting reform, bureaucratic quality represents the administrative ability 
of the government and democratic accountability measures responsiveness of the government to people. 
Average years of total schooling of people over 15 years old and index of electoral competition in the 
legislature are used as a proxy for education and political competition, respectively. Rule of law measures 
the strength and impartiality of the legal system and people's observance of the law. Among factors 
related to environment, the economic risk index to assess a country's economic strength and weakness is 
used as a proxy for economic stability. A dummy variable to reflect the legal tradition takes "1" if a 
country follows common law tradition and "0" otherwise. We use a variable to measure the diffusion of 
accrual accounting among other countries, which is calculated by the number of accrual accounting 
adoption countries weighted by the proportion of their GDP over total GDP in the sample. Lastly, it 
should be noted that we transform population and GDP per capita into log value. Variables used in this 
paper are summarized in Table 2.5. 
 We provide summary statistics of our variables in Table 2.6. When we compare columns (4) 
with (7), countries with accrual accounting have higher levels of bureaucratic quality, democratic 
accountability, rule of law, political competition and economic stability than countries with cash 
accounting. Also, countries that adopt accrual accounting have longer schooling years and greater GDP 
per capita. However, population is bigger in cash accounting countries. A significant difference is not 
found in legal tradition and the spread of accrual accounting. When only developed countries are 
considered, they look homogenous except that developed countries with accrual accounting have bigger 
population and greater proportion of common law tradition than those with cash accounting, as seen in 
columns (5) and (8). In case of the less developed countries in columns (6) and (9), countries with accrual 
accounting seem more developed than those with cash accounting generally because they have better 
institutions in bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, rule of law and political competition, and 
bigger GDP per capita. They also have longer education years. However, they have smaller population 
and less proportion of common law tradition, which is opposite to those in the developed countries.       
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2.5  Empirical Strategies 
 The previous literature uses logistic regression to find the determinants of governmental 
accounting reform empirically. We, however, employ survival analysis. Because survival analysis follows 
subjects (i.e. the governments) over time and observes at which point in time they experience the event of 
interest (i.e. the adoption of accrual accounting). In other words, since it investigates what is the 
likelihood that a government maintains cash accounting system, it seems to be much more appropriate for 
our analysis. Also, since a government that adopts accrual accounting does not turn back to cash 
accounting, we do not need to consider events after the adoption. However, logistic regression is 
influenced by the events after the adoption. Therefore, we can obtain more precise estimation results from 
survival analysis than logistic regression. We use survival analysis as a primary method and check the 
robustness of estimation results from survival analysis by logistic regression. While there are several 
approaches for survival analysis such as parametric, semi-parametric and non-parametric methods, we use 
the Cox proportional hazards model (semi-parametric) in this paper. 
 We estimate the equation; 
                       
  : country,  : year, 
  : adoption of accrual accounting  
         (survival analysis: hazard rate, logistic regression: probability), 
    : determinants of accrual accounting adoption, 
  : error term. 
 As seen in our estimation equation, lagged independent variables are used because it usually 
takes some time to reform a governmental accounting system (policy lag)
51,52
. Also, such variables can 
contribute to addressing endogeneity problems. Since economic stability (or economic crisis) is a 
stimulating variable for government accounting reform, it takes more time for an economic crisis to 
                                                     
51
 For example, Korea experienced economic crisis in 1997~1999, which deteriorated government finances, and 
efficient fiscal management of the government became indispensible in Korea. Then, the Korean government 
propelled fiscal institution reform including the adoption of accrual accounting from 2004 and the law on the new 
government accounting system was legislated in 2007. Finally, fiscal reporting based on accrual accounting was 
released in 2011. 
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 According to PwC (2013), more than three years are required on average to transition to accrual-based 
accounting. 
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induce government accounting reform than other independent variables do. Therefore, we use a 4 year 
lagged variable for economic stability and a 1 year lagged variable for other independent variables such as 
bureaucratic quality, democratic accountability, political competition, etc.     
 We further explore whether significant factors of accrual accounting adoption can be altered 
according to the development level of a country. In order to catch this, we use interaction terms of some 
independent variables such as economic stability, bureaucratic quality, education and rule of law with 
GDP per capita which is a representative indicator for the development level. If the coefficients of these 
interaction terms are significant, then this can be interpreted as evidence that the determinants of accrual 
accounting adoption can differ depending on the development level. In addition, we look into the 
multiplier effects that come from the combination of the estimated coefficients of four independent 
variables and their interaction terms with GDP per capita. We predict whether four independent variables 
enhance or impede the adoption of accrual accounting from these multiplier effects. Thresholds or ranges 
of GDP per capita for these four variables to influence the adoption significantly are also calculated. 
 In order to check the robustness of regression with interactions, or, in other words, whether the 
determinants affect the adoption differently between developed and less developed countries, countries in 
our sample are classified into OECD v. non OECD and developed v. less developed countries
53
, and 
regressions are done separately. If difference in coefficients estimated between OECD and non OECD or 
developed and less developed countries is consistent with estimation with interaction terms for all the 
countries, it will be confirmed that these determinants have a different impact on accrual accounting 
adoption according to the development level.    
 
2.6  Estimation Results 
 Table 2.7 shows the estimation results by using survival analysis (columns (1) and (2)) and 
logistic regression (columns (3) and (4)). While columns (1) and (3) do not include the interaction terms 
of some variables with GDP per capita, columns (2) and (4) contain them in order to analyze how the 
impact of variables such as economic stability, bureaucratic quality, education and rule of law differs 
according to development level. 
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 We divide countries into "developed" and "less developed" by starting with OECD and non OECD, but OECD 
member countries outside Western Europe, North America, Japan, and Oceania (e.g., 9 countries: Turkey, Chile, 
Mexico, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland) are then categorized into "less 
developed." 
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 In column (1) of Table 2.7, governments that have a more stable (or less risky) economy do not 
adopt accrual accounting, which implies that the governments that experienced economic crisis feel 
greater need for reform in order to recover from the crisis, and hence, economic crisis becomes a  
stimulant for reforming governmental accounting. Also, higher democratic accountability, bigger 
population, greater GDP per capita and common law tradition encourage the government to adopt accrual 
accounting significantly, which is consistent with our hypotheses. However, governments with high 
bureaucratic quality hesitate to adopt a new government accounting system, which implies that officials in 
a government with high bureaucratic quality are autonomous from political pressure and resist 
governmental reform. Even though education, political competition and spread of accrual accounting 
among other governments are not statistically significant, they have a positive impact on governmental 
accounting reform. However, rule of law is shown to influence the adoption negatively although it is 
insignificant.  
 As seen in column (3) of Table 2.7, we try logistic regression using the same variables as in 
column (1) in order to check the robustness of estimation results from survival analysis. When estimation 
results in column (3) are compared with those in column (1), we discover that coefficients of every 
explanatory variable in both columns have the same sign and similar size. However, statistical 
significance of coefficients becomes stronger in logistic regression than in survival analysis. Therefore, 
we can find that estimates of survival analysis are robust and survival analysis is a stricter way to look 
into the determinants of accrual accounting than logistic regression. 
 Interpretation from previous estimation results makes us wonder whether economic stability, 
bureaucratic quality, education and rule of law indeed have a consistent impact on the adoption among all 
governments. For instance, bureaucratic quality affects the adoption negatively in columns (1) and (3). 
However, it is more in tune with our hypothesis or general expectation that improved bureaucratic quality 
contributes to adopting accrual accounting for governments in the less developed countries because low 
level of bureaucratic quality prevents the government from implementing the reform. We suggest that 
direction and strength of the determinants differs according to the development level of a country. 
Therefore, we include 4 interaction terms of economic stability, bureaucratic quality, education and rule 
of law with GDP per capita, a proxy for development, and look into the effect of these determinants in 
relation to GDP per capita more precisely. 
 Column (2) in Table 2.7 shows estimation results when 4 interaction terms are included in the 
survival analysis. Coefficients of economic stability and its interaction term with GDP per capita imply 
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that while economic crisis stimulates governmental accounting reform in the developed countries, 
economic stability facilitates the adoption in the less developed countries. Bureaucratic quality and 
education contribute to the adoption of accrual accounting significantly among less developed countries. 
However, both influence negatively or do not impact the adoption among developed countries. The 
estimation of rule of law produces significant coefficients, which indicates that rule of law may impede 
the adoption among countries with small GDP per capita, but facilitates it among rich countries. Column 
(4) in Table 2.7, which uses logistic regression, shows the robustness of our results from survival analysis 
with interaction terms. 
 We show that strength and direction of the determinants change according to GDP per capita. 
Then we ask in what ranges of GDP per capita the determinants influence governmental accounting 
reform significantly and what ranges of GDP per capita encourage or discourage the government to adopt 
accrual accounting? We calculate these ranges as well as the thresholds of GDP per capita in Table 2.8 
and visualize these multiplier effects in Figure 2.3. If we explain them by 95% confidential interval, 
economic stability boosts accrual accounting adoption in countries with GDP per capita less than 1,300 
USD but economic risk does so in countries with GDP per capita more than 9,810 USD. Economic 
stability does not have a significant impact on the adoption for countries with GDP per capita from 1,300 
to 9,810 USD. Also, bureaucratic quality and education enhance the likelihood of adoption for countries 
with GDP per capita below 1,120 and 8,030 USD respectively, but they impede it for countries with GDP 
per capita over 3,585 and 78,000. Since the upper threshold of education is so high, education does not 
affect adoption in the developed countries. However, rule of law discourages accrual accounting adoption 
in countries with GDP per capita less than 850 USD but encourages it in countries with GDP per capita 
more than 14,100 USD.  
 In order to demonstrate our argument that the determinants of accrual accounting adoption 
differs according to development level, we classify countries into OECD v. non OECD and developed 
countries v. less developed countries, and look into the determinants of the two groups separately. Table 
2.9 shows estimation results for OECD v. non OECD and developed countries v. less developed countries, 
respectively. We show that economic stability is significant only in non OECD and less developed 
countries. Also, evidence that economic stability influences the adoption for developed countries and less 
developed countries conversely is found in columns (3) and (4). Bureaucratic quality and education show 
similar results with previous estimations, though significance is lost in some cases. In addition, the 
evidence that bureaucratic quality and education always enhance the adoption in the non OECD countries 
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is found in column (2). Rule of law increases adoption among the developed countries in column (3) but 
decreases it among the less developed countries in column (4). Estimation results of other variables such 
as political competition, legal tradition, and spread of accrual accounting among governments from 
separate regression are also similar with previous estimations, but it should be noted that legal tradition 
and the spread of accrual accounting are significant and strong in OECD and developed countries than 
non OECD and less developed countries. GDP per capita and democratic accountability has a positive 
coefficient consistently in all groups even though it is insignificant sometimes.  
  These estimation results tell us that GDP per capita and democracy increase the demand for 
transparency and enhance accrual accounting adoption. Political competition, common law tradition, 
spread of accrual accounting among other governments and rule of law further facilitate its adoption in 
developed or rich countries. However, bureaucratic quality, education, and economic stability (low risk) 
are not important and even may be negative for adoption of an accrual system in the developed countries 
because they are typically beyond the threshold that is needed for designing and implementing the accrual 
system. For the less developed countries with low income, the binding constraints are bureaucratic quality, 
education and economic risk, and improvement of them contributes to adoption. Political competition and 
common law tradition do not seem to matter. The rule of law may actually slow down the process of 
change in such countries. 
 
2.7  Conclusion 
 We reveal in this paper the determinants of governmental accounting reform, especially accrual 
accounting adoption. The characteristics of the government and the people such as bureaucratic quality, 
democratic accountability, education, population, rule of law and political competition influence the 
adoption. Environmental features such as economic stability, legal tradition and the policy trends of other 
countries also affect it. GDP per capita can be a constraint for it. In addition, we show that GDP per capita 
and democracy consistently have a positive impact on the adoption of accrual accounting, but the effects 
of other determinants on the adoption are different depending on the development level of a country, 
which is represented by GDP per capita. Bureaucratic quality, education and economic stability enhance 
the adoption in the less developed countries but do not in the developed countries. Rule of law facilitates 
the adoption in the developed countries but impedes it in the less developed ones. Political competition, 
common law tradition and spread of accrual accounting among other governments are more crucial in the 
developed countries.    
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 This paper is the first trial to analyze governmental accounting internationally with statistical 
methods and fills the lack of empirical studies in this field. Also, there is a methodological improvement 
in this paper in that survival analysis is employed. Finally, this paper contributes to better understanding 
the different mechanisms of government reform between the developed countries and the less developed 
countries. This paper provides implications for policy makers about conditions under which fiscal reform 
is implemented.  
The adoption of accrual accounting is known as one of institutional reforms in New Public 
Management (NPM) for overcoming governmental crisis. Therefore, if we had analyzed this topic along 
with broader governmental reform such as NPM, we could have obtained different and deep implications.  
 We investigate what makes countries to adopt accrual accounting in this paper. It subsequently 
makes sense to then ask how the adoption of accrual accounting affected the government activities, 
especially fiscal policy outcomes. We wonder whether accrual accounting contributed to improving fiscal 
discipline such as deficits and debt. There is some disagreement in the literature about the practical 
effectiveness of accrual accounting adoption on fiscal variables, but empirical studies to verify its 
effectiveness by comparing countries has not been found. In particular, then, this topic is very meaningful 
for those governments that are considering a shift in their accounting system to an accrual basis.  
 Also, we extend our study to find out whether governmental accounting reform like the adoption 
of accrual accounting affect fiscal transparency or creative accounting like Stock and Flow Adjustment. 
The literature argues that accrual accounting contributes to the improvement of fiscal transparency 
because it reflects the fiscal situation of the government more accurately. However, accrual accounting is 
more complicated than cash accounting and the government may have incentive to revise or manipulate 
fiscal information by using the complexity of accrual accounting. Research on this issue can be helpful in 
judging whether reform of governmental accounting becomes one of the ways to enhance fiscal 
transparency in the government. 
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Chapter 2 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 2.1 Determinants of Government Accounting Reform in Lüder (1992) 
 
Category Determinants 
Accounting 
reform 
Stimuli Situation of financial problems (e.g. when debts increase) 
 
Financial scandal 
 
Capital market (e.g. when the rating agencies lower credit rate of a 
country which does not observe the GAAP in fiscal reporting) 
 
External standard setting institute (e.g. Public sector accounting and 
auditing committee of Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants and 
etc.) 
 
Professional bodies' interest (e.g. American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants and etc.) 
Facilitated 
 
Facilitated 
 
Facilitated 
 
 
Facilitated             
 
 
 
Facilitated 
            
Social 
structural 
variables 
Socio-economic status (e.g. when income or education is high) 
 
Political culture (e.g. when political culture is open and disposed 
towards public participation) 
Facilitated 
 
Facilitated 
 
Structural 
variables    
of the politico- 
administrative 
system 
Staff training and recruitment (e.g. when staff with special qualification 
or training are employed as accountants) 
 
Administrative culture (e.g. when culture in administration is open and 
encourages participation) 
 
Political competition (e.g. when political competition among parties or  
among the electorate, the legislature and the executive is strong) 
Facilitated 
 
 
Facilitated 
 
 
Facilitated 
 
Implementation 
barriers 
Organizational characteristics (e.g. when responsibility for accounting 
practices changes in the government is decentralized) 
 
Legal system (e.g. when a country has common law tradition) 
 
Qualifications of accountancy staff  
 
Size of jurisdiction (e.g. when population or the number and size of the 
government agencies increases)  
Impeded 
 
 
Facilitated 
 
Facilitated 
 
Impeded
1
 
 
1
 Because technical and administrative problems of implementing a new accounting system multiply and 
cost of implementation rises.
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Table 2.2 Summary of Empirical Studies on Government Accounting Reforms 
 
 
Carpenter   
(1991) 
Carvalho et al. 
(2007) 
Anessi-Pessina et al. 
(2008) 
Dependent 
 
GAAP (=1) 
 
Index for accrual 
accounting compliance 
Accrual accounting (=1) 
 
Independent    
  Fiscal 
 
 
Debt(+)
** 
Limit of tax and 
expenditure(+)
*** 
 
Surplus(+)
*
 
Grant from cent'l 
gov't(+)
***
 
Financial dependency(-) 
Per-capita surplus(+) 
Expenditures for 
non-inherently gov't 
activities(+) 
  Economic  
 
 
 
Capital market: rating(+), 
bond issue(+) 
  Political Political competition: 
1-% of winning vote(-)
**
 
Turnout rate(+)
***
 
 
CFO's perception(+)
**
 
Gov't type: province=0, 
municipality=1 (+)
*
 
  Social Population(+)
*** 
 
 
Population(-)
***
 
Population density(-) 
Metropolitan(+)
**
 
Population(+) 
Social capital: presence 
of university(+) 
  Etc. number of staff (+) 
CPA state auditor=1(-) 
 
 
Municipal employees per 
thousand inhabitants(-)
***
 
Average compliance in 
the district(+)
***
 
Number of employee(+) 
Geographic location: 
North=1(+)
* 
 
Object 
 
US state 
governments 
Portuguese local 
governments 
Italian local 
governments 
Method Logistic regression OLS Logistic regression 
Note:  *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1 
      (+) means the positive relationship and (-) means the negative relationship b/w dependent variable. 
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Table 2.3 List of Countries according to Accounting System 
 
Accounting Countries 
Accrual 
(21) 
Argentina, Australia, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Iceland, 
Japan, Korea, Lithuania, New Zealand, Romania, Russia, Slovak, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States 
Cash to accrual 
(16) 
Austria, Bahrain, Belgium, Brazil, Costa Rica, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Malta, Mexico, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey 
Cash 
(90) 
Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Botswana, Bulgaria, Burundi, 
Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chad, China, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech, Dominica, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Gambia, 
Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, 
Iran, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lesotho, 
Liberia, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Moldova, 
Mongolia, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Portugal, Qatar, Rwanda, Serbia, Seychelles, Slovenia, Sri 
Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe 
* In the sample of this paper, 2 countries (Chile and Estonia) are excluded from countries with accrual accounting 
implementation and 37 countries (Afghanistan, Angola, Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belize, 
Bhutan, Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde, Chad, Congo (Dem. Rep.), Dominica, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji,  
Georgia, Grenada, Kiribati, Kyrgyz Republic, Laos, Lesotho, Macedonia, Malawi, Maldives, Mauritius, Nigeria, 
Oman, Rwanda, Serbia, Seychelles, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, 
Tajikistan) are excluded from countries with cash accounting. 
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Table 2.4 Summary of Government Accounting System among Countries 
  
 
Total 
(127) 
OECD IMF EU 
 Member 
(34) 
Non 
(93) 
Advanced
*
 
(30) 
Non 
(97) 
Member 
(28) 
Non 
(99) 
Accrual 21 17 4 15 6 10 11 
Cash to accrual 16 7 9 5 11 6 10 
Cash 90 10 80 10 80 12 78 
 
* While China (Hong Kong), Singapore, and San Marino belong to IMF advanced economies, they are excluded 
from dataset because the type of their accounting system is not certain.  
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Table 2.5 Data and Variables 
 
 Variable Description Source 
Dep. 
Var. 
Accrual accounting 
= 1, if the government begins to adopt accrual 
accounting substantially, = 0, otherwise. 
OECD, IMF and etc. 
Indep. 
Var. 
Economic stability  
A means of assessing a country's current 
economic strengths and weaknesses.  
(range: 0 (highest risk) ~ 50 (highest stable)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Bureaucratic quality 
Institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy (range: 0 (worst) ~ 4 (best)),  
* indicator variable for bureaucratic quality (=1, 
if bureaucratic quality ≥ 3, = 0, otherwise).  
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Democratic 
accountability 
Measurement on how responsive the government 
is to its people (not just whether there are free and 
fair elections) 
(range: 0 (least) ~ 6 (most accountable)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Education 
Barro-Lee's average years of total schooling for 
age 15+ 
World Bank,  
Education DB 
Population Log of population. 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicator 
Rule of law 
The strength and impartiality of the legal system 
and popular observance of the law 
(range: 0 (worst) ~ 6 (best)). 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
 Political competition 
Legislative index of electoral competition 
(range: 1 (least) ~ 7 (most)).  
World Bank, Database 
for Political 
Institutions 
Income per capita Log of GDP per capita (current US dollar). 
World Bank, World 
Development Indicator 
Legal tradition 
= 1, if country has common law system, 
= 0 otherwise. 
La Porta et al. (1999) 
Spread of accrual 
accounting among 
other governments 
The number of countries which begins to adopt 
accrual accounting weighted by GDP portion. 
(i.e. 
      
      
, i: countries which adopts accrual 
accounting except itself, j:all countries)  
Authors' calculation 
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Table 2.6 Summary Statistics (Sample which is Used for Survival Analysis) 
 
 Countries  
with both accountings 
Countries  
with accrual accounting 
Countries  
with cash accounting 
(1) 
All 
(2) 
Dev 
(3) 
Less 
(4) 
All 
(5) 
Dev 
(6) 
Less 
(7) 
All 
(8) 
Dev 
(9) 
Less 
# of countries 88 25 53 35 18 17 53 7 46 
Economic stability (0~50) 34.71  39.71 32.57 36.80  39.46 33.73 33.30  40.35 32.15 
Bureaucratic quality (0~1) 0.47  0.97 0.25 0.69  0.98 0.37 0.31  0.95 0.21 
Democratic account (0~6) 4.27  5.69 3.68 5.09  5.69 4.40 3.72  5.67 3.41 
Schooling years (year) 7.19  9.39 6.32 8.55  9.56 7.47 6.30  8.96 5.89 
Population (million) 51.3  34.1 58.2 41.2 40.5 42.0 58.0 17.7 64.2 
Rule of law (0~6) 4.08  5.45 3.50 4.59  5.45 3.61 3.74  5.43 3.46 
Political competition (1~7) 5.96  6.97 5.53 6.56  6.97 6.10 5.55  6.98 5.32 
GDP per capita (USD) 9,165  20,637 3,964 13,048  20,112 4,321 6,525  21,967 3,837 
Legal tradition (1:common) 0.39  0.52 0.33 0.40  0.61 0.18 0.38  0.29 0.39 
Spread (0~100)  28.13  25.54 29.30 27.49  25.42 30.06 28.56  25.87 29.03 
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Table 2.7 Estimation Results 
  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Economic stability -0.066
*
 1.213
*** 
  -0.075
***
 0.743
***
 
 
(0.036)  (0.406)  (0.017)  (0.186)  
Economic stability * GDP per capita 
 
-0.142
*** 
  
 
-0.092
***
 
  
(0.044)  
 
(0.020)  
Indicator of Bureaucracy quality -1.867
**
 20.401
*** 
  -1.307
***
 16.954
***
 
 
(0.784)  (5.215)  (0.267)  (3.827)  
Indicator of Bureaucracy quality * GDP per capita 
 
-2.618
***
 
 
-2.099
***
 
  
(0.610)  
 
(0.446) 
Democratic accountability 0.642
***
 0.715
** 
  0.370
***
 0.307
***
 
 
(0.181)  (0.350)  (0.086)  (0.109)  
Average years of education 0.074 3.073
*** 
  0.249
***
 1.074
***
 
 
(0.089)  (1.079)  (0.044)  (0.354)  
Average years of education * GDP per capita 
 
-0.317
***
 
 
-0.089
**
 
  
(0.115)  
 
(0.040)  
Population 0.267
*
 0.303
** 
  0.321
***
 0.384
***
 
 
(0.159)  (0.132)  (0.046)  (0.049)  
Rule of law -0.101 -4.571
*** 
 -0.124  -1.891
**
 
 
(0.177)  (1.151)  (0.078) (0.958)  
Rule of law * GDP per capita  
 
0.531
***
 
 
0.220
**
 
  
(0.128)  
 
(0.106)  
Political competition 0.277 1.101 
***
 0.396
**
 1.008
***
 
 
(0.260)  (0.411)  (0.164)  (0.374)  
GDP per capita 1.012
***
 8.485
***
 1.227
***
 6.019
***
 
 
(0.289)  (1.743)  (0.119)  (0.929)  
Legal tradition 0.678
*
 1.028
***
 0.641
***
 0.883
***
 
 
(0.371)  (0.386)  (0.143)  (0.155)  
Spread of accrual accounting among other gov’t 0.152 0.394***   0.022*** 0.031*** 
 
(0.179)  (0.151)  (0.003)  (0.004)  
Constant 
  
-21.727
***
 -70.143
***
 
   
(1.714)  (10.606)  
Method Survival Survival  Logistic Logistic 
Observations 1,617 1,617 2,024 2,024 
Χ2 62.75 72.67 403.28 249.64 
(p-value) (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  (0.0000)  
Note:  *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Table 2.8 Threshold and Multiplier Effect 
 
 Estimates Thresholds of GDP per capita (USD)  
with No Multiplier Effect 
 (i) (ii) Less 95%
1)
  90%
1)
 100% 90%
1)
 95%
1)
 More 
Stability 1.213 -0.142 + 1,300 1,925 5,176 8,875 9,810 - 
BQ 20.401 -2.618 + 1,120 1,347 2,421 3,393 3,585 - 
Education 3.073 -0.317 + 8,030 9,210 16,467 46,300 78,000 - 
Rule of law  -4.571 0.531 - 850 1,100 5,507 11,850 14,100 + 
(i) Estimated coefficient of a variable, (ii) Estimated coefficient of interaction terms of a variable with GDP per 
capita 
1) Confidence interval 
+ means enhancement of the adoption but – means prevention of the adoption.  
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Table 2.9 Estimation Results of OECD / Non OECD and Developed / Less Developed Countries 
 
 
(1) 
OECD 
(2) 
Non OECD 
(3) 
Developed 
(4) 
Less developed 
Economic stability 0.751 2.048
***
 -0.291 1.547
***
 
 
(1.268) (0.488) (2.031) (0.564) 
Economic stability * GDP per capita -0.088 -0.245
***
 0.015 -0.173
***
 
 
(0.129) (0.061) (0.200) (0.063) 
Indicator of Bureaucracy quality 118.660
**
 19.912
**
 205.764
**
 20.567
***
 
 
(47.185)  (7.827) (91.274)  (6.633) 
Indicator of Bureaucracy quality * GDP per capita -13.703 2.672
***
 -21.679 -2.769
***
 
 
(5.241) (1.019) (14.808) (0.785) 
Democratic accountability 0.947 0.624 0.668 0.900
***
 
 
(0.726) (0.577) (1.098) (0.312) 
Average years of education 5.311 1.101 15.741
*
 1.893 
 
(4.498)  (2.123) (9.116)  (1.631) 
Average years of education * GDP per capita -0.557 0.215 -1.583
*
 -0.157 
 
(0.457) (0.275) (0.910) (0.197) 
Population 0.177 1.231
***
 0.061 0.682
*
 
 
(0.142) (0.406) (0.203) (0.367) 
Rule of law -1.473 -9.723
**
 37.817
***
 -7.141
***
 
 
(5.233)  (4.067) (11.763)  (2.636) 
Rule of law * GDP per capita  0.201 1.138
**
 -3.656
***
 0.813
**
 
 
(0.573) (0.522) (1.172) (0.317) 
Political competition 27.643 1.169 Omitted 0.987
*
 
 
. (0.764) . (0.535) 
GDP per capita 21.145
***
 7.206
**
 56.637 7.808
**
 
 
(5.246) (3.389) . (3.215) 
Legal tradition 1.533
***
 0.008 1.031
*
 0.546 
 
(0.590) (0.990) (0.602) (0.748) 
Spread of accrual accounting among other gov’t 0.569*** 0.279 0.515*** 0.599* 
 
(0.162) (0.456) (0.185) (0.356) 
Method Survival Survival Survival Survival 
Observations 470 1,147 348 1,269 
Χ2 65.38 140.01 26,914.94 113.98 
(p-value) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Note:  *** p-value < 0.01, ** p-value < 0.05, * p-value < 0.1, ( ) standard error 
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Figure 2.1 Extended Contingency Model for Determinants of Governmental Accounting Reform 
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Figure 2.2 Survival Function and Hazard Function 
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Figure 2.3 Multiplier effect 
 
a. Economic Stability 
 
 
b. Bureaucratic quality 
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Figure 2.3 (cont.) 
 
c. Education 
 
 
d. Rule of law 
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CHAPTER 3 
Governmental Accounting Systems and Fiscal Policy Outcomes
54
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 International organizations like the OECD and IMF have recommended that countries change 
their governmental accounting from a cash basis to an accrual basis in order to enhance the efficiency and 
accountability of government finance. Some governments have adopted accrual accounting since early 
1990. 
 The literature has proved empirically that better fiscal institutions such as an efficient budget- 
making process, medium-term fiscal planning, etc., improve fiscal policy outcomes such as debt and 
deficits (von Hagen et al., 1995; Alesina et al., 1999; Alt et al., 2006b; World Bank, 2013). However, 
there is a dispute about the effect of the accrual accounting adoption on fiscal policy outcomes. Some 
scholars argue that the adoption of accrual accounting influences government finance in practice and 
contributes to improving the fiscal condition of the government. Others assert that it does not impact the 
fiscal policy outcomes substantially. Nevertheless, there has been no systematic empirical assessment of 
the effect of accrual accounting adoption. Therefore, it is meaningful to investigate whether the adoption 
of accrual accounting actually influenced the fiscal policy outcomes among countries.  
 We investigate in this paper how governmental accounting reform to an accrual basis impacts 
debt and deficits among countries. Also, we analyze the influence of the accrual accounting adoption on 
Stock-Flow Adjustment (SFA), which is defined the difference between a net increase of debt and a 
deficit, in order to find out whether it prevents creative accounting and improves fiscal transparency 
actually. Since countries have different features, especially pertaining to the development level, we 
categorize them into two groups — developed countries and less developed countries — and investigate 
whether the impact of accrual accounting adoption differs between the groups.  
 We use the data of 99 countries (25 developed ones, 74 less developed ones) from 1989 to 2012. 
21 countries have adopted and 16 countries are adopting accrual accounting, but 62 countries use cash 
accounting in 2012. In addition, the data for the status of accrual accounting adoptions, fiscal policy 
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outcomes and the factors influencing them are obtained from international agencies, research institutes 
and the literature.  
We regard the adoption of accrual accounting as a natural experiment among countries and 
employ a fixed-effects model, a generalized approach of the Difference-in-Difference (DID), for 
estimations. Also, quantile regression is combined with a fixed-effects model because it is helpful in 
verifying how accrual accounting adoption influences fiscal policy outcomes differently at each quantile 
of its conditional distribution. For instance, the adoption might play different roles between countries with 
a big amount of debt and those with a small size of one. This fact cannot be found from the traditional 
least squares method. However, quantile regression enables us to estimate the coefficients in different 
percentiles of distribution, in other words, the effect of accrual accounting adoption on fiscal policy 
outcomes at their each percentile. In addition, we choose control variables from previous studies on the 
determinants of fiscal outcomes in order to enhance the fitness of the estimations, and we use lagged 
independent variables to respond to an endogeneity problem.  
We find that the adoption of accrual accounting diminishes debt and deficits in the developed 
countries, which becomes stronger and more significant in those with bigger debt and deficits. However, 
the reform into accrual accounting increases debt and deficits in the less developed countries, even though 
it is mostly insignificant in the analysis of deficits. Since the adoption can be a signal of better fiscal 
management, it impacts the credibility of a country positively, thus increasing the borrowing ability of the 
less developed countries which usually have credit constraint and hence their debt and deficits. However, 
in the developed countries, which already have high credibility, the adoption of accrual accounting does 
not increase their borrowing ability, but instead improves their debt and balance. In addition, we discover 
that accrual accounting adoption lessened SFA in the developed countries with considerable SFA. In 
other words, it contributes to decreasing creative accounting and improving fiscal transparency of the less 
transparent governments. However, the adoption has no impact SFA in the less developed countries. 
Our findings give policy implications for countries or international organizations which are 
considering or recommending to reform governmental accounting system. They should consider that 
accrual accounting in the less developed countries might be ineffective at improving fiscal discipline and 
might not achieve one of its fundamental targets such as the enhancement of fiscal transparency. Thus far, 
only a small number of case studies have investigated how the adoption of accrual accounting in countries 
such as New Zealand or Australia influences the fiscal policy outcomes. Therefore, this paper is the first 
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attempt to find the effectiveness of accrual accounting adoption empirically by comparing many 
countries. 
We introduce the previous studies concerning the adoption of accrual accounting in the second 
section, and explain the data and variables used in this paper in the third section. The fourth section shows 
the results of the event analysis, and the fifth section consists of the empirical strategies which are 
employed in this study. The estimation results are provided in the sixth section. Lastly, the seventh 
section is a concluding discussion. 
 
3.2  Existing Literature 
 Recently, international organizations such as the IMF, OECD, UN, EU and IFAC have 
recommended that governments change their accounting system from a cash basis to an accrual basis. 
Also, international organizations have constituted new provisions for accrual accounting and provided 
them to member countries.
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 Many scholars argue that accrual accounting has positive effects on government finance. Accrual 
accounting produces better information and improves transparency and responsibility in the government 
(Blöndal, 2003). According to a survey by PwC (2013), many governments think that greater 
transparency and accountability, a comprehensive inventory of assets and liabilities, and performance 
assessment are the main benefits of accrual accounting adoption. Guthrie (1998) indicates that as financial 
data become more transparent, accrual accounting improves the comparability of the financial 
performance among jurisdictions and provides a greater accountability of public resources. Chan (2003) 
suggests that the accrual basis and government-wide reporting are preferable for the clear disclosure of 
government finance. In addition, Alt et al. (2006b) show that fiscal transparency improves fiscal 
discipline in such areas as debt and deficits.  
How have benefits from accrual accounting been reflected in fiscal policy outcomes? Some 
empirical studies have been found on this topic. However, there is disagreement on its effectiveness. 
Warren et al. (2003), Streck et al. (2005), and Carlin (2005) argue that accrual accounting influences the 
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 The IMF's GFSM (Government Financial Statistics Manual) 2001, the UN's SNA (System of National Accounts) 
2008, the EU's ESA (European System of National and Regional Accounts) 1995, and the IFAC's IPSAS 
(International Public Sector Accounting Standards) 1992 recommend that governments make financial statements on 
the accrual basis. 
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government performance and accountability positively, improves the fiscal status of the government (i.e., 
diminishes debt and deficit), and changes the composition of the government expenditures from the 
government administration to education, social welfare, and health. However, Blöndal (2009), Zurburg 
(2008), and Christiaens et al. (2008) argue that accrual accounting rarely affects government activities 
because accounting is just a tool to measure the fiscal performance. Therefore, it is natural to wonder if 
accrual accounting influences the fiscal policies of a government in practice.  
 Furthermore, most empirical research on accrual accounting adoption is case studies on New 
Zealand or Australia that adopted accrual accounting system early. The literature to investigate the 
effectiveness of accrual accounting adoption by a comparative study of many countries has hardly been 
found. Marti (2008) suggests that “the governments with accrual accounting among the 26 OECD 
countries show better accountability and effectiveness,” but his paper explains bureaucratic responsibility 
and efficiency, not fiscal policy. Research to investigate the effects of accrual accounting adoption on 
fiscal policy outcomes has not been done so far.  
 Also, since developed countries rather than less developed ones have reformed their 
governmental accounting to the accrual basis, it is quite difficult to discover a study that looks into the 
adoption of accrual accounting in a less developed country. Hence, the literature does not answer the 
question of whether the adoption of accrual accounting has similar or different impacts in the two groups.    
  There is much literature to look for the determinants of fiscal policy outcomes like debt, balance, 
and SFA (Persson et al., 2004, 2007; Fabrizio et al., 2006; Tujula et al., 2004; Sanz et al., 2002; Weber, 
2012; Seiferling, 2013). Various determinants such as institutional, economic and other conditions are 
found in the literature, but governmental accounting reform has not been discovered to be one of them.   
 Therefore, our study is the first attempt to investigate the effects of accrual accounting adoption 
on fiscal policy outcomes by comparing many countries, including less developed as well as developed 
ones.  
 
3.3  Data and Variables 
 We use the panel data from 99 countries (25 developed countries, 74 less developed countries) 
from 1989 to 2012. Of them, 21 have adopted and 16 are shifting to accrual accounting, but 62 still use 
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the cash accounting in 2012. Countries that are classified according to development level
56
 and 
governmental accounting type are listed in Table 3.1. We discover the status of accrual accounting 
adoption among governments from the OECD's "International Budget Practices and Procedures 
Database" from 2007/2008 and the IMF's "Government Finance Statistics Yearbook" published in recent 
years. We also learn the time of the adoption from international agencies, ministries of finance, and the 
literature, as well as both OECD and IMF data.  
 When a government transfers from cash accounting to accrual accounting, it generally follows 
the procedure: (i) announce a plan for accrual accounting adoption; (ii) establish an institute to set up the 
new governmental accounting standards; (iii) execute a pilot project; (iv) draft legislation; (v) apply the 
accrual system to individual ministries; (vi) apply the accrual system to all ministries; (vii) release a 
consolidated financial statement based on accrual accounting. We recognize the stages of "draft 
legislation" and "apply the accrual system to individual ministries" as substantial implementation of the 
reform from cash to accrual accounting, because the adoption could be cancelled before these stages, as it 
was in the Netherlands. Hence, the governmental fiscal policies are influenced by the accounting reform 
from stages (iv) and (v), and they are affected more strongly in stages (vi) and (vii), where the accrual 
accounting adoption is completed. We construct an independent variable for the accrual accounting 
adoption to reflect how far along in the process the country is. When a country does not try to change its 
accounting system or a country’s accrual accounting adoption stays in stages (i)~(iii), “0” is assigned. 
When the status attains stage (iv) or (v), “1” is given; and when it reaches stage (vi) or (vii), “2” is given.  
In order to find how the governmental accounting reform affects the fiscal policies substantially, 
we employ fiscal policy outcomes such as debt, balance and SFA as dependent variables. Debt and 
balance are usually taken as fiscal discipline indicators of the government. Our source for debt and 
balance information is the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO). The data in the WEO are constructed 
on the constant standards during our analysis period,
57
 so the fiscal policy outcomes before and after the 
governmental accounting reform can be compared. In order to check whether accrual accounting 
improves fiscal transparency and discourages creative accounting
58
 by the government, we employ SFA 
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 How to categorize countries into the developed and the less developed countries is same as Chapter 2.  
 
57
 The IMF Government Financial Statistics (GFS) are not continuous in time series in some countries due to 
changes by the GFSM. 
 
58
 The government hides deficits by reverting to window dressing or shifting fiscal expenditures off the budget 
(Milesi-Ferretti, 2003). 
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as a dependent variable. SFA is measured by the difference between the net increase in debt and deficit 
(i.e. (Debtt –Debtt-1) - Deficitt). If the government hides some of the deficits, then the net increase in debt 
will be greater than the deficits and SFA will have a positive value. However, if there is no creative 
accounting in the government, SFA will be close to “0.” Milesi-Ferretti (2003), Bernoth et al. (2008) and 
others show by using the data of SFA that creative accounting has been conducted among governments. 
In addition, we divide these fiscal policy outcomes by GDPs for comparisons among countries. 
 The control variables are selected from the previous studies on the determinants of fiscal policy 
outcomes that are introduced in Section 2. Also, the significance and correlation of the control variables 
are thought about in order to get fitness of estimation and to respond to a multicollinearity problem. 
The institutional control variables of contract reliability and democratic accountability (i.e. 
responsiveness to the people) are included. The economic control variables are international trade, 
inflation and index of economic stability. The last control variables are size and age structure of 
population. The data for these control variables are obtained by requesting information from international 
agencies and research institutes, and reviewing the literature. We summarize the data and variables in 
Table 3.2. 
Table 3.3 provides basic information about each variable according to the development level and 
governmental accounting method of the country. While the developed countries show bigger debts and 
deficits than the less developed ones, they have better institutions in contract reliability and democracy 
accountability, and more stable economies regarding economic stability index and inflation. The variables 
in the developed countries look similar irrespective of the governmental accounting status. However, the 
developed countries with accrual accounting have smaller SFAs than those with cash accounting. The less 
developed countries with accrual accounting reveal differences in some variables from those with cash 
accounting, and they have features that are somewhat close to those of the developed countries. For 
instance, they show more stable economy and better institutions than the less developed countries with 
cash accounting.  
 
3.4  Event Analysis  
Figure 3.1 shows the event analysis for an individual country, in other words, what happened in 
debt and balance before and after accrual accounting was adopted by a country. “0”, “1”, and “2” on the 
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horizontal axis means that a country uses cash accounting, is transferring from cash to accrual accounting, 
and has adopted accrual accounting, respectively.  
Most of the 18 developed counties with accrual accounting, excluding Belgium, France, Finland, 
Iceland, and Korea, show a decrease in debt after substantial implementation of the accrual accounting 
reform (i.e., they have changed from “0” to “1” on the horizontal axis). This implies that the 
governmental accounting reform contributes to decreasing debt in the developed countries, especially in 
stages (iv) or (v) in the procedure. Balance is also improved in many of the developed countries after 
substantial implementation. However, this is less clear than the trend of debt.  
It is difficult to discover a common pattern in the less developed countries. While debt increases 
consistently in Chile, Costa Rica, Latvia, Poland, and Romania after substantial implementation, it 
decreases in Turkey, Peru, and Russia. Furthermore, balance fluctuates but mostly declines in the less 
developed countries. While debt and deficits seem to diminish after accrual accounting adoption in the 
developed countries, they do not in the less developed countries. 
Figure 3.2 presents the event analysis for the countries divided by level of development. It is 
implemented in the following way. The beginning year of substantial implementation of the accrual 
accounting adoption for a country is normalized to year t. Debt, balance and SFA are averaged across 
countries and plotted for years t−3, t−2, t−1, t, t+1, t+2, and t+3, along with 95 percent confidence 
intervals. In order to find out whether accrual accounting adoption contributes to better fiscal discipline 
and fiscal transparency, as shown by reduced debt, deficit and SFA, it is instructive to compare years t−3, 
t−2, and t-1 with years t+1, t+2, and t+3. 
While balance is apparently improved among the developed countries in years t+2 and t+3 (i.e., 
2 and 3 years after substantial implementation of the reform), it declines consistently in the less developed 
countries in years t+1, t+2, and t+3. We discover a similar pattern in the analysis of debt. After substantial 
implementation of the reform, debt decreases slightly in the developed countries, while it stays still or 
increases a little in the less developed countries. We find a clearer pattern for balance in Figure 3.2 than in 
Figure 3.1. Consequently, the event studies in Figures 3.1 and 3.2 indicate that debt and deficits decrease 
in the developed countries but increase in the less developed countries after accrual accounting adoption. 
In addition, SFA decreases clearly in the developed countries in years t+2 and t+3, while it fluctuates in 
the less developed countries. It indicates that the adoption lessens creative accounting and enhances fiscal 
transparency in the developed countries rather than in the less developed ones.    
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3.5  Empirical Strategies  
 We investigate how the adoption of accrual accounting impacts fiscal policy outcomes such as 
debt, balance, and SFA. We estimate these impacts, controlling for institutional, economic and other 
factors that influence fiscal policy outcomes. The adoption can be regarded as a natural experiment. 
Countries that adopted accrual accounting belong to the treated group and countries that did not adopt it 
are the control group. We apply a fixed-effects model including country and year dummy variables, 
which is a generalization of the DID approach. The following estimation model is proposed: 
                                     
i: country, t: year, 
Yit: fiscal policy outcomes, 
ACCit-1: indicator variable of accrual accounting adoption,  
Xit-1: institutional, economic and other control variables, 
ci, dt: country and year dummies,  
εit: error term. 
An indicator variable for accrual accounting adoption is used to find how the adoption influences 
fiscal policy outcomes. Control variables have generally been used in past studies that explain what 
makes the difference in fiscal policy outcomes. The country and year dummies are included to capture 
characteristics of a specific country such as culture and norms, and relevant cross-country related 
macroeconomic shocks in a certain year such as oil-price shock, and world-wide financial crisis 
respectively, that are not fully reflected in the control variables of the estimated equation. Including 
country and year dummies becomes a response to the omitted-variable problem. Also, a lagged dependent 
variable is included as an independent variable in order to respond to autocorrelation. Lagged independent 
variables are used in order to cope with reverse causality to some degree. 
Furthermore, we apply quantile regression to a fixed effects model for the panel data (Koenker, 
2004). Quantile regression is a statistical technique to estimate inference about conditional percentiles of a 
dependent variable. From this nature of quantile regression, we can investigate how accrual accounting 
adoption influences fiscal policy outcomes of debt, deficits and SFA differently according to the level of 
debt, deficits and SFA in a country. For example, it is possible to estimate whether the adoption impacts 
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debt and deficits of a country with a high level of debt and deficits in the same way that a country with a 
low level of debt and deficits is affected.  
Most developed countries have changed or are changing their governmental accounting method 
to the accrual basis, but most less developed countries still use cash accounting. Also, many features of a 
country, including institutional levels such as contract reliability and democratic accountability as well as 
economic conditions such as stability and inflation, are homogeneous within groups of developed or less 
developed countries, but heterogeneous between them. Hence, we do not ascertain that accrual accounting 
adoption creates the same impact on fiscal policy outcomes in both developed and less developed 
countries, so we analyze these impacts separately by the groups. 
 
3.6  Estimation Results 
Estimation results on the effect of accrual accounting adoption on fiscal policy outcomes are 
plotted in Figure 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5. These figures present the graphs of estimated coefficient (solid line) and 
95% confidence intervals (dotted lines) in each percentile.  
First, we analyze the impact of the adoption on debt and show the estimation results in Figure 
3.3. We find that the adoption diminishes debt for most percentiles in the developed countries, and the 
absolute value of its coefficient steadily increases as regression moves to the upper tails of the quantile. In 
other words, the adoption decreases debt largely in a highly-indebted country. However, opposite results 
are found in the less developed countries. The adoption expands debt for most percentiles in the less 
developed countries, and this increasing impact becomes larger and more significant in the upper tail of 
the quantile, which indicates that the adoption enlarges debt in a less developed country with a great deal 
of debt.  
The coefficients of the control variables in the regressions are consistent with the arguments in 
the literature, though they are insignificant occasionally. The control variable of our interest is contract 
reliability that is a proxy of credibility of a country. While contract reliability increases debt in the less 
developed countries, it has an insignificant effect on debt in the developed countries, which can be 
interpreted as credibility is crucial for borrowing only in the less developed countries. In addition, the 
lagged dependent variable included in the regression shows a positive sign and statistical significance, 
which indicates an autocorrelation of debt between the current and previous year.      
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Second, we look into the effect of the adoption on deficits and suggest the estimation results in 
Figure 3.4. We find that the results are coherent with the analysis of debt, although the estimated 
coefficients for accrual accounting adoption lose significance. For the developed countries, we discover 
that the adoption improves balance or decreases deficits significantly in the lower tails of the quantile. It 
indicates that accrual accounting contributes to lessening deficits only in the developed countries with a 
great size of deficits. The effect to improve deficits gets weaker and becomes insignificant as regression 
moves to the upper tails of the quantile. For the less developed countries, the coefficient of accrual 
accounting adoption has a negative sign. In other words, the adoption seems to worsen balance or increase 
deficits for nearly all percentiles in the less developed countries but it is not statistically significant.         
The interesting finding in the analysis of balance is that democratic accountability reflecting the 
government’s responsiveness to people played a contradictory role on deficits between the developed 
countries and the less developed countries. While it decreases deficits in the developed countries, it 
increases them in the less developed ones. If the government in the less developed countries is 
excessively sensitive to people’s desire, it will turn to populism easily and increase expenditure without 
considering revenue because a system to control the government is less established in the less developed 
countries. Also, the lagged dependent variable is positive and significant. 
We find that while the adoption of accrual accounting diminishes debt and deficits in the 
developed countries, it enlarges those outcomes in the less developed countries. Why does accrual 
accounting adoption have these opposite effects? 
The adoption of accrual accounting is seen as a signal of better fiscal management of the 
government, which might impact the credibility of a country positively. Therefore, the borrowing ability 
of less developed countries, which usually have credit constraints, can increase, which in turn causes 
deficits and debt to increase. However, since the credibility level in the developed countries is already 
high, the adoption does not affect their borrowing ability and increase debt and deficits. Instead, the 
governments of developed countries improve their fiscal discipline from stronger fiscal controls and from 
more efficient management made possible by more detailed information from accrual accounting.  
The governments in the less developed countries may adopt accrual accounting in order to shrink 
debt and deficits. However, it is difficult to improve fiscal discipline substantially only from accrual 
accounting adoption, because the harmonized development of other related institutions is also needed. If 
we assess the development of other fiscal institutions by a medium-term fiscal plan, the adoption of 
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accrual accounting is less supported by or harmonized with those institutions in the less developed 
countries
59
. In addition, since governmental debt in developed countries is greater than that in less 
developed ones, as seen in Table 3.3, reducing it is more needed in the developed ones.  
Figure 3.5 displays the estimation results for the influence of accrual accounting adoption on 
SFA, in other words, whether the adoption decreases creative accounting, which is measured by SFA, and 
then increases fiscal transparency in practice. Lagged dependent variables are positive and significant in 
upper percentiles or the countries with a big amount of SFA, implying that creative accounting is a 
phenomenon that is seen systematically in less transparent countries.  
Since hiding more deficits causes a higher positive SFA value and most countries have positive 
SFAs, coefficients with a negative sign are considered to diminish SFA or creative accounting, and 
enhance fiscal transparency. We find that the adoption shrinks SFA for all percentiles in the developed 
countries and has a significant effect on SFA from percentiles above 65. Also, absolute value of the 
coefficient for the adoption steadily increases as regression moves to the upper tails of the quantile. In 
other words, the adoption prevents creative accounting and improves fiscal transparency effectively in the 
developed country with a great size of SFA. However, for the less developed countries, the adoption has 
no significant impact on SFA.  
Also, estimated coefficient of contract reliability in the developed countries has a negative sign 
for most percentiles and goes downward as regression moves to the upper tails of the quantile, which 
indicates that contract reliability decreases SFA sufficiently in a developed country with considerable 
SFA. This may come from the fact that the government with high contract reliability can access credit 
market easily and has less incentive to depend on SFA when it increases expenditure. 
Finally, when all countries are analyzed together, coefficient for accrual accounting adoption is 
not statistically significant in the cases of debt, deficits and SFA. Hence, separate analyses for the 
developed and the less developed countries give us important implications that we would not discover if 
we looked at all of the countries together. 
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 A reform in medium-term fiscal planning (no midterm fiscal planning → midterm expenditure framework → 
midterm budgetary framework → midterm performance framework) is a representative improvement of a fiscal 
institution that has been implemented extensively from the beginning of 1990 (World Bank, 2013).  
Correlation between accrual accounting adoption and medium-term fiscal plan reform:  
(developed countries) 0.5457, (less developed countries) 0.2619. 
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3.7 Conclusion 
We investigate how the shift from cash accounting to accrual accounting affects fiscal policy 
outcomes and find that while the adoption of accrual accounting contributes to diminishing debt and 
deficits in the developed countries, it increases debt and deficits in the less developed countries, even 
though the findings of deficits are insignificant in some percentiles. These imply that the adoption in the 
developed countries produces more information, strengthens the controls on debt and deficits, and 
improves fiscal discipline. However, it increases the borrowing ability by performing as a signal of better 
fiscal management, and hence expands debt and deficits in the less developed countries. In addition, the 
adoption diminishes SFA and enhances fiscal transparency in the developed countries with a low fiscal 
transparency level. The adoption has no effect on SFA in the less developed countries. 
Empirical literature on evaluations of the effects of accrual accounting adoption on fiscal policy 
outcomes in many countries has not been found. Hence, this study is the first such attempt and also 
provides objective grounds for judging the effectiveness of the governmental accounting reform. It makes 
implications to international agencies or countries which recommend or consider changing governmental 
accounting system.  
 Still today, most governments in the less developed countries use cash accounting. As more 
governments change their accounting system to the accrual basis, more concrete estimations and 
implications will be made. 
     We find that accrual accounting is effective for fiscal discipline in the developed countries. Then 
it is natural to wonder what features of a country are needed for the effectiveness, and whether the 
accounting system affects fiscal policies directly or through other institutions. We expect that these 
questions will be answered in future studies as more countries implement accrual accounting. 
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Chapter 3 Tables and Figures 
 
Table 3.1 List of Countries according to Accounting System 
 
Accounting Developed countries (25) Less developed countries (74) 
Accrual 
(21) 
(14 countries) 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Iceland, Japan, 
Korea, New Zealand, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, United 
Kingdom, United States 
(7 countries) 
Argentina, Chile, Estonia, Lithuania, Romania, 
Russia, Slovak 
 
Cash to 
accrual 
(16) 
(4 countries) 
Austria, Belgium, Israel, Italy 
 
 
(12 countries) 
Bahrain, Brazil, Costa Rica, Latvia, Malta, Mexico, 
Peru, Philippines, Poland, South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey 
Cash 
(62) 
(7 countries)  
Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(55 countries) 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Botswana, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, China, Congo, D.R., Croatia, Cyprus, 
Czech, Egypt, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Honduras, 
Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Jordan, Kenya, 
Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Moldova, Mongolia, 
Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, 
Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Serbia, Slovenia, Sri 
Lanka, Suriname, Syria, Tanzania, Trinidad and 
Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab 
Emirates, Uruguay, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe  
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Table 3.2 Data and Variables 
 
 Variable Description Source 
Dep. 
Var. 
Debt General government gross debt (% of GDP) 
IMF, World 
Economic Outlook 
Balance General government net lending (% of GDP) 
IMF, World 
Economic Outlook 
Stock-flow 
adjustment  
Difference of net increase of debt and deficit 
(% of GDP)  
(i.e. = [(Debtt –Debtt-1)-Deficitt]/GDP*100)  
IMF, World 
Economic Outlook 
Indep. 
Var. 
Accrual accounting 
adoption 
0: cash accounting ,  
1: shift from cash to accrual,  
2: accrual accounting 
OECD, IMF, etc. 
Contract reliability 
Measurement on risks of modification in 
contracts in the form of cancellation or 
outright expropriation  
(range: 0 (least) ~ 6 (most reliable)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Democratic 
accountability 
Measurement on how responsive the 
government is to its people (not just whether 
there are free and fair elections) 
(range: 0 (least) ~ 6 (most accountable)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Bureaucratic quality 
Institutional strength and quality of the 
bureaucracy (range: 0 (worst) ~ 4 (best)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
GDP per capita Log of GDP per capita (2005 PPP) World Bank, WDI 
Openness Trade (% of GDP) World Bank, WDI 
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) World Bank, WDI 
Economic stability 
A means of assessing a country's current 
economic strengths and weaknesses.  
(range: 0 (least) ~ 50 (most stable)) 
PRS, International 
Country Risk Guide 
Population Log of population. World Bank, WDI 
Population  
over age 65 
Population over ages 65 (% of total 
population) 
World Bank, WDI 
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Table 3.3 Summary Statistics (Sample which is Used for Analysis of Debt) 
 
 Both  Accrual accounting Cash accounting 
 All Dev Less All Dev Less All Dev Less 
# of countries 99 25 74 37 18 19 62 7 55 
Debt 56.7 63.3 53.0 55.8 64.5 38.6 57.0 62.4 55.1 
Balance -1.92 -2.08 -1.83 -2.00 -1.87 -2.26 -1.89 -2.24 -1.77 
SFA 2.42 1.75 2.80 1.50 1.24 2.01 2.72 2.18 2.91 
Contract reliability 8.26 9.44 7.59 9.05 9.49 8.18 8.00 9.40 7.50 
Democratic account 4.54 5.75 3.86 5.58 5.83 5.09 4.19 5.68 3.67 
Openness 83.9 76.9 87.9 74.4 65.5 91.9 87.0 86.2 87.3 
Inflation 24.6 2.9 36.8 3.4 2.4 5.5 31.4 3.3 41.3 
Economic stability 36.5 39.7 34.7 38.4 39.5 36.1 35.9 39.9 34.4 
Population (million) 67.5 38.0 84.4 47.7 46.2 50.8 73.6 31.5 88.9 
Population over 65 9.7 14.5 6.9 13.3 14.8 10.2 8.5 14.3 6.5 
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Figure 3.1 Event Analyses of Individual Countries 
a. Developed countries 
< USA >     < UK > 
 
< Austria >     < Belgium > 
  
< Denmark >     < France > 
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Figure 3.1 (cont.) 
< Italy >      < Sweden > 
  
 < Switzerland >     < Canada > 
  
< Japan >     < Finland > 
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Figure 3.1 (cont.) 
< Iceland >     < Spain > 
  
 
< Australia >     < New Zealand > 
  
< Israel >     < Korea > 
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Figure 3.1 (cont.) 
b. Less developed countries 
< Turkey >     < South Africa > 
  
< Brazil >     < Chile > 
  
< Costa Rica >     < Mexico > 
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Figure 3.1 (cont.) 
< Peru >      < Barain > 
  
< Thai >      < Philippines > 
  
< Russia >     < Slovak > 
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Figure 3.1 (cont.) 
< Estonia >     < Latvia > 
  
< Lithuania >     < Poland > 
  
< Romania >  
 
* Malta and Argentina are excluded because of the unavailability of the data on fiscal policy outcomes. 
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Figure 3.2 Event Analyses for Developed Countries and Less Developed Countries  
a. Debt 
< Developed countries >    < Less developed countries> 
    
 
b. Balance 
< Developed countries >    < Less developed countries> 
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Figure 3.2 (cont.) 
c. SFA 
< Developed countries >    < Less developed countries> 
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Figure 3.3 Quantile Regression Plots of Debt  
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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Figure 3.3 (cont.) 
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Figure 3.3 (cont.) 
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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Figure 3.4 Quantile Regression Plots of Balance  
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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Figure 3.4 (cont.) 
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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Figure 3.4 (cont.) 
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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Figure 3.5 Quantile Regression Plots of SFA  
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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Figure 3.5 (cont.) 
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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Figure 3.5 (cont.) 
 (1) Developed Countries (2) Less Developed Countries 
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